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Religious Courts in Secular
Jurisdictions
HOW JEWISH AND ISLAMIC COURTS ADAPT TO
SOCIETAL AND LEGAL NORMS
Rabea Benhalim†
INTRODUCTION
In the post-9/11 era, public fear about the potential
imposition of religious law on secular countries continues to rise.
Presumptions about what comprises religious law, and its
incompatibility with secular laws, abound. For some individuals,
the fear of Islamic law has led to anti-Sharia legislation1 and
heated debates about “creeping Sharia.”2 For others, the fear is
that Judaism, Christianity, or religion generally will carry too
much weight in secular activities.3 In light of all these concerns,
even those who are broadly tolerant of religious practice might
be surprised to discover that religious laws, and Islamic law in
particular, are adjudicated and sometimes enforced in the
United States, England, and Israel. The enforcement of religious
† William H. Hastie Fellow, University of Wisconsin Law School. I am
immensely grateful for comments and feedback received from Asifa Quraishi-Landes,
Miriam Seifter, David Schwartz, Gwendolyn Leachman, Ciro Faienza, Tasnim
Benhalim, and Adriana Aristeiguieta. For helpful comments on earlier versions of this
article, I also thank the participants in the Islamic Law session at the Annual
Association of American Law Schools annual meeting and the participants in the Law
and Religion in the United States, Canada, and Israel session at the Law and Society
Association annual meeting. Any errors are mine.
1 “Since 2010, 201 anti-Sharia law bills have been introduced in 43 states. In
2017 alone, 14 states introduced an anti-Sharia law bill, with Texas and Arkansas
enacting the legislation.” Swathi Shanmugasundaram, Anti-Sharia Law Bills in the
United States, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/
2018/02/05/anti-sharia-law-bills-united-states [https://perma.cc/7Y22-JE4D].
2 Eugene Volokh, Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts,
66 OKLA. L. REV. 431, 431 (2014); see also CREEPING SHARIA, https://creepingsharia.word
press.com [https://perma.cc/R2VY-KPV7].
3 See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Some Worry About Judicial Nominee’s Ties to a
Religious Group, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/us/
amy-coney-barrett-nominee-religion.html [https://perma.cc/6TM4-RFKY] (discussing
controversial Senate comments about whether now-Judge Amy Barrett would be able to
separate her judging from her Catholic faith).
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laws may seem anathema to the very principles on which those
countries exist.
Missing from the popular discourse is any recognition of
the multiple and varied ways in which religious courts,
historically and today, operate in secular jurisdictions. Israel, for
example, has rendered Jewish and Islamic law enforceable via
state courts since the country’s inception.4 Likewise, the United
States and England each have longstanding religious courts
whose decisions are enforceable via the countries’ respective
arbitration acts.5 Yet even in academia, the study of religious
courts in secular contexts is narrow and limited. The academic
analysis that does exist is rarely comparative—typically
examining religious courts only within a particular subject
matter or jurisdiction. Moreover, normatively, this work most
often focuses on the single question of whether secular
governments should accommodate religious arbitration.6
A more systematic approach is needed. Rather than
examine how secular governments accommodate religious
judicial bodies (RJBs), as other scholars have done,7 this article
seeks to understand the ways in which RJBs conform to their
secular environments. This article’s approach encompasses the
range of RJBs operating as informal mediation bodies, arbitral
bodies, and state courts, both in contexts where the population
served represents a majority of the population and in contexts
where the population served represents a minority of the
population. By considering together entities that have elsewhere
been considered separately, this article aims to capture and
exemplify their common ground and relevant differences.
4 See Moussa Abou Ramadan, Notes on the Anomaly of the Shari’a Field in
Israel, 15 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 84, 85–88 (2008); see also Zvi Triger, Freedom from Religion
in Israel: Civil Marriages and Cohabitation of Jews Enter the Rabbinical Courts, 27 ISR.
STUD. REV. 1, 2–3 (2012).
5 See MICHAEL J. BROYDE, SHARIA TRIBUNALS, RABBINICAL COURTS, AND
CHRISTIAN PANELS: RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION IN AMERICA AND THE WEST 7–10, 177–79 (2017).
6 See generally BROYDE, supra note 5; Michael J. Broyde et al., The Pillars of
Successful Religious Arbitration: Models for American Islamic Arbitration Based on the
Beth Din of America and Muslim Arbitration Tribunal Experience, 30 HARV. J. RACIAL
& ETHNIC JUST. 33 (2014); Bilal M. Choksi, Comment, Religious Arbitration in Ontario—
Making the Case Based on the British Example of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, 33
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 791 (2012); Almas Khan, The Interaction Between Sharia and
International Law in Arbitration, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 791 (2006); Ayelet Shachar,
Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 573 (2008); Erin Sisson, The Future of Sharia Law in
American Arbitration, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 891 (2015); Nicholas Walter, Religious
Arbitration in the United States and Canada, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 501 (2012);
Norman Doe, Britain’s Religious Courts Symposium, 13 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 354 (2011).
7 See generally Russell Sandberg et al., Britain’s Religious Tribunals: ‘Joint
Governance’ in Practice, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (2013) (examining the ways in
which Great Britain accommodates religious tribunals).
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What emerges from this analysis is that, contrary to the
concerns of the public discourse and past scholarship, religious
courts that serve religious minorities tend to adapt to their
secular surrounding, rather than the other way around. They
accommodate, by necessity, both the desires of litigants who,
living in democratic societies, have come to expect RJBs to
preserve their secular civil rights, and the pressures of the
secular courts on which they rely to enforce their decisions.
Although the general public and politics often treat RJBs as
alien to their secular environments,8 this article demonstrates
that RJBs serving minority populations respond to pressures
from the legal environment in which they operate.9 RJBs may
strive to apply religious law by relying purely on original texts
and traditional legal scholarship, but in practice, RJBs often
accommodate both substantive and procedural secular norms.
At the theoretical level, religious judicial accommodation
bears some resemblance to two other strands of thought in public
law and administration. From one standpoint, RJBs are engaged
in a sort of dialogue with popular culture that echoes the
thinking of popular constitutionalism.10 Some scholars writing
in this vein have argued that Supreme Court decisions “on a
politically sensitive issue” are properly viewed “as generating a
dialogue with the political branches of government and the
people.”11 Likewise, controversial RJB decisions, especially
decisions that affect women’s rights, may generate a dialogue
with the religious laity that the RJBs serve and the civil courts
that enforce their decisions.
The adaptations of RJBs also resonate with literature
that depicts institutions in survival mode. Indeed, religious
courts vary from traditional Article III courts in one important
way: religious courts have a plausible fear of losing business. To
be sure, government-run courts may fear backlash that can

8 See, e.g., Lorraine E. Weinrib, Ontario’s Sharia Law Debate: Law and
Politics under the Charter, in LAW AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN CANADA 239, 250
(Richard Moon ed., 2008) (quoting the premier of Ontario, Dalton McGuinty, saying:
“[t]here will be no sharia law in Ontario. There will be no religious arbitration in Ontario.
There will be one law for all Ontarians.”).
9 See discussion infra Section II.D.
10 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 5–6 (2004); LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 8 (2004); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 2596, 2598 (2003).
11 Daan
Braveman, On Law and Democratic Development: Popular
Constitutionalism and Judicial Supremacy, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 41, 47–48 (2005).
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erode their credibility,12 but religious courts might altogether
cease to exist if litigants pivot to state-run courts. This suggests
that RJBs’ practice of accommodation is therefore rooted in a
sense of survival—the sort of “organizational maintenance” that
public administration scholar James Wilson has described.13
This article develops these claims by examining four
RJBs—two Jewish and two Islamic: (1) Jewish arbitral bodies in
the United States; (2) Islamic arbitral bodies in England; (3) the
Rabbinical courts of Israel; and (4) the Sharia courts of Israel.
Regarding the design of the study, the selection of these courts
hinges on a number of factors. First, both Islamic and Jewish
RJBs share similar legal structures, historical experiences, and
positions within the countries in which they operate.14 Second,
they all operate in common law jurisdictions. Third, the
countries in which they are located all have well-established
Jewish communities and rabbinical courts (batei din, sing. beth
din). Fourth, these jurisdictions have sizeable Muslim
populations with Islam as the largest minority religion in
England and Israel, and the second largest minority religion in
the United States. Fifth, these RJBs are well-established and
actively issuing rulings. Finally, these RJBs all primarily deal
with family law cases and face similar controversies regarding
the impact of their application of religious family law on
women’s rights. They all also deal with commercial matters, in
which they face limited to no controversy.
Additionally, instead of focusing only on jurisdictions
wherein RJBs operate via arbitration or mediation,15 this article
aims to address RJBs within the full spectrum of enforceability in
12 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS,
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, xi (2012).
13 JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 30–51 (1973).
14 While Christian alternative dispute resolution (ADR) exists in the United
States, this article almost exclusively focuses on Muslim and Jewish judicial bodies and
excludes Christian judicial bodies. The reason for this is two-fold. First, the motivations for
Christians to engage in Christian ADR are “based on teachings of the Bible . . . which
encourage Christians to settle disputes in a peaceful manner,” and not as a means of
applying religious law in lieu of secular law. BROYDE, supra note 5, at 17 (citations omitted).
Second, within Christianity the relationship to religious law is distinctly different than
within Judaism and Islam. Unlike Judaism and Islam, “there seem to be vast areas of
secular law that have no direct Christian counterpart.” Id. at 18. Therefore, the motivations
for selecting Christian ADR are best understood as selecting a particular forum rather than
specific law. Id. Furthermore, within the Catholic Christian context, while canon law is
“one of the most ancient and robust legal systems in the world,” it is mostly used to resolve
“church governance issues.” Id. at 18–19. Due to accessibility and common practice,
Catholic laity rarely use canon law and “Catholic Church ecclesiastical law has no private
ADR mechanism to resolve disputes between private parties.” Id. at 19.
15 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Selby & Anna C. Korteweg, Introduction: Situating the
Sharia Debate in Ontario, in DEBATING SHARIA: ISLAM, GENDER POLITICS, AND FAMILY
LAW ARBITRATION 12 (Anna C. Korteweg & Jennifer A. Selby eds., 2012).
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which they operate. Prior works have only comparatively
examined religious arbitral bodies that serve minority
populations and addressed whether secular legal systems should
accommodate religious minorities. This article includes the
Rabbinical courts of Israel as a means of examining differences in
RJB behavior when serving a majority population versus a
minority population. Review of this full spectrum will help
illustrate the conclusion that the secular environment—including
the enforceability and exclusivity of subject matter jurisdiction—
in which RJBs operate influences their procedure and judgments.
Part I of this article offers a primer on the jurisdiction
and origins of RJBs in Israel, the United States, and England. It
then synthesizes prior scholarship on RJBs and notes the public
controversies that prompted that work. Part II explores the
environmental milieu of historical, political, legal, and social
factors in which these judicial bodies operate. Part III
examines—through case law, rules of procedure, and anecdotal
case studies—the environmental impact on the degree to which
RJBs accommodate secular procedural and substantive norms.
It concludes with a broader view of the implications of this study
and suggests directions that future research might take.
I.

UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS JUDICIAL BODIES

Understanding why and how RJBs accommodate secular
norms requires basic background knowledge of the origins,
jurisdiction, and guiding laws of RJBs, as well as knowledge of
the controversies and scholarship RJBs have sparked. The
majority of the existing literature focuses on whether secular,
democratic nations should continue to foster legal pluralism that
includes religious judicial options.
Israel, the United States, and England all have long
histories of promoting legal pluralism that includes religious
judicial options. The Israeli Rabbinical and Sharia courts have
operated since the founding of the state, and indeed, even predate its creation, originating in the Ottoman Empire.16 Jewish
RJBs in the United States began with pre-World War I Kehillah
tribunals and have continued to develop into the robust
arbitration bodies that are active today.17 Islamic RJBs in the
United States remain in their infancy. Within England, the
London Beth Din dates back to the early 1700s and remains

16
17

See Ramadan, supra note 4, at 85–88; see also Triger, supra note 4, at 2–3.
See Walter, supra note 6, at 514.
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active today.18 England has also witnessed the development of
British Islamic RJBs with the growth of England’s Muslim
population.19 Jews and Muslims continue to seek alternatives to
the civil judicial system in order to resolve disputes according to
their respective religious laws.20 The roots these judicial bodies
have in their respective environments and the depth of these
roots are key factors in understanding how RJBs operate within
the larger judicial system and how it affects them.
A.

Primer on RJBs

Jewish arbitration bodies in the United States, Islamic
arbitration bodies in England, the Sharia courts of Israel, and
the Rabbinical courts of Israel represent the spectrum of the
RJBs that exist in secular contexts. The Rabbinical and Sharia
courts of Israel occupy one end of the spectrum. These state-run
courts hold exclusive jurisdiction in many areas of family law.21
Islamic RJBs in England occupy the other end of the spectrum.
Due to limitations within English arbitration law, these
religious bodies tend to operate as informal mediation panels
with some enforceable arbitration for commercial matters.22
Jewish RJBs in the United States fall in the middle of this
spectrum with more robust RJBs that operate both as informal
mediation and, due to flexibility within American arbitration
law, more often as formal, enforceable arbitration. This
spectrum is best understood in the context of the historical
origin, jurisdiction, and guiding laws of each RJB.
This article will use the Israeli Rabbinical courts as the
sole case study of a religious court in a secular society that serves
the majority of the population. All the other courts examined
serve a minority population in their respective countries. Israel’s
Sharia courts will be the sole example of a minority court that
enjoys exclusive jurisdiction in some matters. The other two case
studies, Islamic RJBs in England and Jewish RJBs the United
States, both differ from Israel’s religious courts in that they
operate independently of the state via arbitration. In Israel, the
Sharia and Rabbinical courts enjoy exclusive jurisdiction in
18 About the London Beth Din, THEUS, https://www.theus.org.uk/article/aboutlondon-beth-din [https://perma.cc/23ZY-87JH].
19 See BROYDE, supra note 5, at 177–78.
20 See Ginnine Fried, Comment, The Collision of Church and State: A Primer
to Beth Din Arbitration and the New York Secular Courts, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633,
635 (2004) (describing the “Talmudic ban on Jews voluntarily presenting their cases to
courts governed by idolatrous people[ ] .”)
21 See Triger, supra note 4, at 6.
22 See Broyde et al., supra note 6, at 36–37.
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some matters of family law.23 Conversely, in the United States
and England, litigants go before these RJBs only when they have
elected to use religious arbitration/mediation because there is no
jurisdictional exclusivity to compel them otherwise.
1. The Jewish and Islamic RJBs in Israel
The Rabbinical courts and Sharia courts in Israel share
the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, a fact which
explains their contemporary relationship to the state. Under the
Ottoman Empire, non-Muslim religious communities were
granted significant autonomy, including their own independent
legal systems.24 The legal independence of minority religious
communities is known as the Millet System, wherein minority
courts operated independently of the state-operated Sharia
courts.25 With the creation of the State of Israel, aspects of the
Millet System, such as the concept of separate religious courts
for the different religious communities, were maintained.26
Today, the Rabbinical and Sharia courts of Israel enjoy
exclusive jurisdiction in some areas of personal status law and
concurrent jurisdiction with civil courts in others.27 This
jurisdictional focus on family law also reflects the influence of
the late-Ottoman Empire. The historical legacy reaches into the
present and extends beyond the mere existence of religious
courts into the very laws they enforce.
With present-day Israeli Sharia courts, the following
laws are derived from Ottoman codes: the Majalla (1876), the
Ottoman Law of Family Rights (OLFR) (1917), and the Law of
Procedure for Sharia Courts (1917). Ido Shahar explains why
Ottoman law remains the law for Muslims in Israel today:
Since the Israeli legislature has generally refrained from intervening
in the material religious laws . . . and since there is no Council of
Muslim Jurists (majlis ifta’) in Israel, nor any other legitimate
Muslim body of legislation, the Ottoman codes have remained in force
in shari’a courts until this very day.28

While these codes remain in place, they have been limited via
civil family laws. The focus of these civil laws is the promotion
See Triger, supra note 4, at 6.
IZHAK ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL SYSTEM 13 (1975).
25 Id.
26 See Aharon Layish, Adaptation of a Jurists’ Law to Modern Times in an Alien
Environment: The Case of the Shari’a in Israel, 46 DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 168, 170 n.11 (2006).
27 See Ramadan, supra note 4, at 99–100.
28 IDO SHAHAR, LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE HOLY CITY: COMPETING COURTS,
FORUM SHOPPING, AND INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS IN JERUSALEM 34 (2016).
23
24
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of gender equality. While the laws apply to civil and religious
courts, the legislature did not intend for them “to affect the
jurisdiction of the religious courts.”29
Until 2001, the Sharia courts in Israel enjoyed the
broadest jurisdiction of any of the religious courts.30 The Sharia
courts “were accorded exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of
personal status . . . while the other courts were accorded
exclusive jurisdiction in some matters, and concurrent
jurisdiction in others.”31 In 2001, however, the Knesset32 granted
civil family courts “concurrent jurisdiction over Muslim
litigants, similar to the jurisdiction they had already with regard
to litigants belonging to other religious communities.”33
Surprisingly, the Rabbinical courts have had more limited
jurisdiction for much of Israeli history. This first limitation on the
Rabbinical courts’ jurisdiction originated prior to the creation of
the State of Israel, during the Mandate period.34 Under the
Ottoman Empire, the Rabbinical courts “had exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters of personal jurisdiction within the
Jewish community.”35 The British Mandatory Authority limited
the Rabbinical courts’ exclusive jurisdiction “to matters of divorce,
alimony, and the confirmation of wills” and allowed for concurrent
jurisdiction with civil courts for other matters of personal status,
including “maintenance, guardianship, legitimation, and
adoption of minors, succession, incompetency, etc.”36
In the 1950s, the Knesset “passed a series of laws which
modified the jurisdiction, structure, and even some norms of the
Rabbinical Courts,” such that they only possess exclusive
jurisdiction in marriage and divorce and additionally have
concurrent jurisdiction in the confirmation of wills.37 During this
period, Rabbinical court judges “became state officials akin to
the judges of the civil courts and with equivalent salaries.”38
Despite shifts in their exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction, the Rabbinical courts have maintained exclusive
control over the interpretation of the Jewish law applied in their
courtrooms. Although Conservative, Reform, and Liberal
Judaism exist in Israel, the Rabbinical courts exclusively apply
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Ramadan, supra note 4, at 87 (the Knesset is the name for Israel’s parliament).
SHAHAR, supra note 28, at 37 n.24.
MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 52 (1994).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 53.
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Orthodox interpretations of Jewish law.39 The preservation of
Orthodox Judaism in the courts predates the creation of the
state from an agreement, which “set the parameters of what is
known in Israel today as the religious status quo.”40 Under the
“status quo agreement,” the Rabbinical courts maintain
jurisdiction over matters of personal status for all Jews,
regardless of their individual adherence to Judaism.41
2. The Islamic RJBs in England
Islamic RJBs in England emerged out of a meeting in
1982 of Islamic scholars in Birmingham.42 Their intention had
been to create a “new Britain-wide shariʿa council” that would
address “a wide range of religious issues, from banking and
mortgages to standards for halal food.”43 One founding scholar,
Suhaib Hasan, later reflected that:
We intended that the council provide decisions for the Muslim
community on any and all matters, but pretty soon it became clear to
us that we were spending all our time giving women divorces. This
was not what we set out to do, but there was a vacuum in the
community, and we filled it.44

Because of issues regarding women’s rights, these RJBs have
become controversial in England. The press45 and politicians46
have often mischaracterized the jurisdiction of Islamic RJBs in
England as allowing for “legally binding” Islamic Sharia courts
for all matters. In reality, under the Arbitration Act of 1996, only
some religious disputes of a commercial nature “may be resolved
through binding arbitration” under the Act.47 Binding

See id. at 51.
See id.
41 Id.
42 JOHN R. BOWEN, ON BRITISH ISLAM: RELIGION, LAW, AND EVERYDAY
PRACTICE IN SHARI’A COUNCILS 47 (2016).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See John Bingham, Sharia Courts ‘as Consensual as Rape,’ House of Lords
Told, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9621319/
Sharia-courts-as-consensual-as-rape-House-of-Lords-told.html [https://perma.cc/DN8HM447]; Matthew Hickley, Islamic Sharia Courts in Britain are now ‘Legally Binding’,
DAILY MAIL (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1055764/Islamicsharia-courts-Britain-legally-binding.html [https://perma.cc/Q5KQ-W2PJ].
46 See Frank Cranmer, Sharia law, the Arbitration Act 1996 and the
Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill, LAW & RELIGION UK (Oct. 24, 2012),
http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2012/10/24/sharia-law-the-arbitration-act-1996-andthe-arbitration-and-mediation-services-equality-bill [https://perma.cc/GJX9-AWHC].
47 BOWEN, supra note 42, at 155; Arbitration Act of 1996, c. 23 (UK), http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/contents [https://perma.cc/R4RQ-GA6P].
39
40
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enforceability requires that a “proper contract is drawn up in the
presence of a lawyer and freely agreed to by the parties.”48
Similar to the situation in the United States, the
Arbitration Act “limits the conditions under which either party
may appeal,” such that “appeals are allowed on grounds that the
procedures followed were unfair or misleading.”49 Also like the
United States, the Act does not prohibit “a religious body from
supervising such an arbitration procedure . . . as long as proper
contractual procedures are followed.”50
While the Arbitration Act clearly allows for religious
arbitration of commercial matters, it is less clear regarding
family law. The act “prohibits arbitration of all except civil law
matters. This excludes all family law as well as criminal
disputes.”51 Prior to 2012, divorced couples were prevented “from
submitting financial matters to binding arbitration because
doing so would ‘fetter’ the court.”52
Shifts to the law in 2012 now indicate that judges may
rule that “the arbitration of financial and property disputes for
divorcing couples” is permitted under the act.53 A 2012 proposal
from the Institute of Family Law Arbitrators (IFLA) has been
“met with approval from some key judges.”54 The proposal might
allow arbitration of some family law matters within religious
courts (in the form of financial and property disputes), although
the proposal “stipulates that the arbitrator may only decide the
dispute in accord with the law of England and Wales, that is, not
elements of Islamic law, Jewish law, or foreign law.”55
As a result, disputes before Islamic RJBs in England most
often take the form of mediation or non-binding arbitration, as
the majority of disputes before it are divorce cases.56 The most
prominent of these courts is the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal
(MAT), which “provides a network of relatively formal and
transparent arbitral tribunals for British Muslims.”57 Other
BOWEN, supra note 42, at 155.
Id.
50 Id.
51 See Sisson, supra note 6, at 892–93.
52 Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973, c. 18 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1973/18 [https://perma.cc/D86Q-WF7S].
53 Id.
54 BOWEN, supra note 42, at 177.
55 Id.
56 See Services: How Does the Islamic Sharia Council Work?, ISLAMIC SHARIA
COUNCIL, http://www.islamic-sharia.org/services [https://perma.cc/YJW5-XTKY] (“80%
of all letters received by the Council are related to matrimonial problems faced by
Muslims in the UK. The remaining are related to people asking for Islamic injunctions
(fatawa) pertaining to their daily lives. Matters of dispute amongst Muslim groups have
been also referred to the Council for resolution.”).
57 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 187.
48
49
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courts, such as the Islamic Sharia Council (ISC)58 and the Muslim
Law Sharia Council, “operate outside the British arbitration
framework” and issue unenforceable decisions.59
The MAT differentiates itself from the sharia councils by,
in addition to marital mediation, also offering commercial
arbitration. It has focused its efforts on “offer[ing] the Muslim
community a real and true opportunity to settle disputes in
accordance with Islamic Sacred Law with the knowledge that
the outcome as determined by MAT will be binding and
enforceable.”60 “The . . . MAT was established in 2007 to provide
British Muslims with a more effective alternative for resolving
disputes in accordance with Islamic law . . . .”61 Due to the MAT’s
popularity and focus on enforceability, it serves as a case study
in understanding how and why Islamic RJBs “settle disputes in
accordance with Islamic Sacred Law” in such a way that is also
enforceable under the Arbitration Act of 1996.62
3. The Jewish RJBs in the United States
The legal situation of religious courts in the United
States is similarly situated to those in England with a few
important differences. Arbitration existed during America’s
colonial period and was widely used by Christian communities.63
In the post-Revolutionary era, religious arbitration lost its
general popularity among Christians with a number of notable
exceptions within certain religious communities, including
Utopian and Mormon communities.64 The American Jewish
community is perhaps the most well-known religious community
in the United States to utilize religious arbitration.65
One of the foremost RJBs in the United States is the Beth
Din of America (BDA). It was developed in 1960 “to provide a more
effective adjudicative forum for Jews committed to living in
58 See About Us, ISLAMIC SHARIA COUNCIL, http://www.islamic-sharia.org/aboutus/
[https://perma.cc/C4CX-V85G] (“The Islamic Sharia Council was formed to solve the
matrimonial problems of Muslims living in the United Kingdom in the light of Islamic family
law. The council comprises members from all of the major schools of Islamic legal thought
(mad’hab) and is widely accepted as an authoritative body with regards to Islamic law.”).
59 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 187. These courts have doctrinal differences rooted
in their practitioners’ adherence to and training in particular Islamic law schools of
thought. See id. at 187–88. Despite their differences, they typically accept “the other’s
judgments to be sound.” BOWEN, supra note 42, at 85.
60 About Us: Why MAT?, MUSLIM ARB. TRIBUNAL, http://www.matribunal.com/
why-MAT.php [https://perma.cc/N6C7-WZ7Y].
61 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 177.
62 About Us: Why MAT?, supra note 60.
63 Walter, supra note 6, at 510–11.
64 Id. at 512–13.
65 See Broyde et al., supra note 6, at 36.
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accordance with halakha [Jewish law] in a secular American legal
and social context.”66 It has gone through several iterations and
in its current iteration, “provides a sprawling network of Jewish
law courts that function as fully legal, halakha-compliant
arbitration panels” that offer observant Jewish litigants access to
a religious law-compliant adjudicatory forum marked by the
characteristic expedience and affordability of arbitration.67
The BDA has achieved this via the adoption of “a host of
prudent measures designed to improve the transparency,
consistency, equity, and professionalism of its arbitral process,”
and in doing so, “has gained widespread acceptance among
America’s secular courts, which are comfortable enforcing its
arbitral decisions, and which to date have never overturned a
BDA-issued arbitration award.”68 While the BDA handles many
marital matters, it also arbitrates in commercial matters.69 Due
to its well-known success, the MAT modeled itself on the BDA.70
The BDA utilizes the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to
enforce its decisions.71 U.S. arbitration law is “strongly grounded in
contract theories” and courts generally hold that “[p]arties’
decisions to arbitrate private disputes should be upheld in order to
promote and respect the contractual autonomy and freedom of
private parties to order their private affairs in whatever way seems
best to them.”72 As a result, sophisticated religious arbitration has
developed for both commercial and marital matters.
The FAA does not have the same limitations on family law
arbitration as the United Kingdom’s Arbitration Act of 1996.73
While divorce must go through the civil courts, parties may agree
via contract to arbitrate aspects of their divorce (although some
limitations exist in state law).74 Unlike England, in many
instances, parties may arbitrate such matters as property

BROYDE, supra note 5, at 138 (emphasis in original).
Id. (emphasis in original).
68 Id.
69 See Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration Decisions Made by
Muslim Religious Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 379,
394 n.65 (2009).
70 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 173.
71 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006); Amy S. Fancher,
Policies, Frameworks, and Concerns Regarding Shari’a Tribunals in the United States—
Are They Kosher?, 24 REGENT U.L. REV. 459, 473–77 (2012).
72 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 95–96.
73 Arbitration Act of 1996, c. 23 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
1996/23/contents [https://perma.cc/R4RQ-GA6P].
74 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 132 (citing AM. JUR. 2D DIVORCE & SEPARATION § 665
(2016)) (discussing how some states maintain exclusive control over some areas of family
law, including child support and custody, despite contractual agreements to arbitrate.).
66
67
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distribution, alimony, child support, and custody agreements.75
Like the MAT, it deals with divorce and commercial cases.76
Due to political and cultural realities regarding Islamic
law in American society, Islamic binding arbitration has yet to
develop in the United States as it has in England. Some nonbinding mediation and arbitration has developed in the United
States but remains limited to serving the North Texas Muslim
community.77 While the Jewish and Muslim communities in the
United States share similar characteristics in terms of size and
the role of religious law in their faiths, Jewish courts are much
better established.78 Therefore, the BDA is used as a case study
for understanding how and why Jewish courts in the United
States accommodate secular justice norms.
B.

Past Controversies

Understanding why RJBs make adaptations and
accommodations in secular contexts challenges the alarm and
assumptions about Islamic law raised by politicians and the
general populace. A series of controversies in Canada and the
United Kingdom in the last decade has prompted the majority of
the scholarship on RJBs. These controversies reflect rising
tensions around the question of the role of religious law in
secular countries. Such alarm flared following proposals to
accommodate religious arbitration in Canada and the U.K.79 The
general perception of RJBs, especially Islamic courts, exhibits
an understanding of religious law that is antiquated at best and
dangerous at worst. Critics of RJBs often focus on Islamic law
and reduce it to the subset of criminal laws that detail corporal
punishment (hudud laws).80 The prevailing assumption about
Islamic law is that it “is a uniform thing, a fixed, unchangeable
Id. at 131–32.
Id. at 138.
77 See Our Mission, ISLAMIC TRIBUNAL, https://www.islamictribunal.org/ourmission [https://perma.cc/4VXA-GSE6] (“The need for a mediation and non-binding
arbitration firm that adheres to Islamic principles in the Muslim community has been a
long time in the making.”).
78 See BROYDE, supra note 5, at 138, 175 (stating that the BDA was founded in
1960 and Muslims are still in the process of developing religious tribunals).
79 See Selby & Korteweg, supra note 15, at 22 (“The resulting public debate did
not reflect how ordinary Sharia is in the everyday lives of many Canadian Muslims, but
instead portrayed it as alien within a liberal democratic context. Nor did the debate reflect
the complexity or malleability of Sharia. Rather, it created two positions: one for the
institutionalization of Sharia-based arbitration boards and one against.”); Bingham, supra note 45.
80 See Selby & Korteweg, supra note 15, at 19 (describing reactions during the
Ontario Sharia Debate as follows: “The media portrayed Islamic law as patriarchal and
authoritarian, as punishment rather than rehabilitation-oriented, and (perhaps most
importantly) as unchanging.”).
75
76
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set of norms that is binding upon all Muslims.”81 Two events in
recent memory reflect these commonly held beliefs. Both have
triggered scholarship on the topic.
The first event was a lengthy international debate, which
occurred in Ontario, Canada from 2004 to 2005.82 It arose when
the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (IICJ) announced in 2003
that it “would begin offering arbitration services in family
disputes in accordance with established Islamic law and the
province of Ontario’s 1991 Arbitration Act.”83 Although Jewish
and Christian groups had previously used Ontario’s 1991
Arbitration Act to “set up alternate dispute resolution boards
that arbitrated in accordance with their religious principles,”
these RJBs did not trigger a state of alarm.84 Conversely, the
IICJ’s announcement that they would establish an Islamic
arbitral body, which “paralleled Jewish arbitration practices,”
resulted in a massive debate.85
In June 2004, in response to the public outcry and debate,
Michael Bryant, the former Attorney General, and Sandra
Pupatello, the Minister Responsible for Women’s Issues, appointed
former Attorney General Marion Boyd “to conduct a formal review
of the use of arbitration in family and inheritance law in the
province.”86 In December 2004, Boyd published her report with a
set of extensive recommendations and “concluded that binding
religious arbitration of family law issues based on ‘Islamic legal
principles’ was permissible according to the Arbitration Act.”87
Boyd’s recommendations called for greater oversight of
religious arbitration both prior to and post arbitration. Boyd’s
recommendations included: (1) screening of arbitration parties,
prior to arbitration, in order to determine whether any “issues of
power imbalance” exist and to “ensure that both parties are
agreeing voluntarily to arbitration and understand the nature
and consequences of entering into the process”88; and (2) civil court
judicial review of arbitration awards that would require the court
to set aside arbitration awards that do not meet an established
81 Jan Michiel Otto, Towards Comparative Conclusions on the Role of Sharia in
National Law, in SHARIA INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS
OF TWELVE MUSLIM COUNTIES IN PAST AND PRESENT 615 (Jan Michiel Otto, ed., 2010).
82 Anver M. Emon, Islamic Law and the Canadian Mosaic: Politics, Jurisprudence,
and Multicultural Accommodation, 87 CANADIAN B. REV. 392, 392 (2008).
83 Selby & Korteweg, supra note 15, at 12.
84 Id. at 18.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 20.
87 Id. at 21.
88 Marion Boyd, Ontario’s “Sharia Court”: Law and Politics Intertwined, in
ISLAM AND ENGLISH LAW: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE PLACE OF SHARIA 176, 179
(Robin Griffith-Jones ed., 2013).
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set of requirements designed to protect civil rights.89 Had these
recommendations been implemented, they would have resulted in
a much higher degree of substantive review of religious
arbitration. Boyd’s report, however, was not enough to squelch
the swell of panic the IICJ’s initial announcement created.
The movement against Islamic arbitration in Ontario
included “prominent women’s organizations such as the pro-faith
Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW) and the secular
International Campaign against Shariah Courts.”90 Of particular
concern was that women would be unequal under Islamic law,
especially with regard to divorce.91 By the summer of 2005,
international opposition to Islamic faith-based arbitration resulted
in “eighty-seven human rights groups” opposing the Ontario plan.92
Most of this opposition “did not reflect how ordinary Sharia is in
the everyday lives of many Canadian Muslims, but instead
portrayed it as alien within a liberal democratic context.”93 Despite
Boyd’s recommendations, as well as support from prominent
scholars, the outcry resulted in amendments to the Arbitration Act
that banned religious arbitration.94
A similar phenomenon occurred in in the U.K. in 2008
when then Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, gave a
speech “explor[ing] ways in which the legal system might
‘recognise shari’a,’” observing that such recognition would entail
“access to recognised authority acting for a religious group.”95
His speech led to fierce opposition to the perceived imposition of
Islamic law, with headlines declaring that “Islamic sharia courts
in Britain are now ‘legally binding’” and “Sharia courts as
‘consensual as rape.’”96
C.

Prior Scholarship

Most scholars of religious law who pay attention to RJBs
focus on the normative question of whether RJBs have a role to
play in secular jurisdictions.97 Scholarship is mostly divided
between those in favor of religious legal pluralism, arguing that
Id.
Selby & Korteweg, supra note 15, at 20.
91 Id. at 20–21.
92 Id. at 22.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 23; Choksi, supra note 6, at 791.
95 BOWEN, supra note 42, at 175.
96 Hickley, supra note 45; Bingham, supra note 45.
97 See, e.g., Selby & Korteweg, supra note 15, at 12; AYELET SHACHAR,
MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 3 (2001);
Shachar, supra note 6; Broyde et al., supra note 6; Choksi, supra note 6.
89
90
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RJBs promote religious liberty and social integration,98 and those
in favor of “one law for all,” arguing RJBs undermine civil liberties
and civil integration.99 These scholars can all be broadly
understood as working within the field of legal pluralism. As
other scholars examining religious courts have found, “the
insights of legal pluralism are most useful” in understanding the
complexity of the courts, their application of religious law, and
their interaction with civil law.100
Professor Ayelet Shachar’s work, Multicultural
Jurisdictions,101 is the seminal work in this area. Scholars102 and
activists103 have especially built on her theories regarding how
governments can best accommodate cultural and religious
differences, while preserving women’s rights.104 Shachar
provides support for arguments in favor of “expanding the
jurisdictional autonomy of religious and cultural minorities,” but
also “offer[ing] hardnosed and practical legal-institutional
solutions to the problem of sanctioned in-group rights
violations.”105 In particular, academic literature has focused on
Shachar’s theory of “transformative accommodation.”106
According to the former Archbishop of Canterbury, this theory
provides “a scheme in which individuals retain the liberty to
choose the jurisdiction under which they will seek to resolve
certain carefully specified matters,” while concurrently ensuring
the protection of civil rights.107
On the other side of the debate are those scholars108 and
activists who advocate for “One Law for All” and the eradication of
RJBs.109 This literature is primarily motivated by concerns
See, e.g., BROYDE, supra note 5, at 237–38, 259.
Emon, supra note 82, at 420.
100 See, e.g., Pascale Fournier et al., Secular Rights and Religious Wrongs? Family
Law, Religion and Women in Israel, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 333, 338 (2012).
101 SHACHAR, supra note 97.
102 See Sandberg et al., supra note 7, at 265 (citing ANTHONY BRADNEY, LAW
AND FAITH IN A SCEPTICAL AGE 51–52 (2009); Bernard Jackson, ‘Transformative
Accommodation’ and Religious Law, 11 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 131, 132 (2009); AVIGAIL
EISENBERG & JEFF SPINNER-HALEV, MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES: EQUALITY, RIGHTS
AND DIVERSITY (2005).
103 See generally Rowan Williams, Civil and Religious Law in England: A
Religious Perspective, 10 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 262, 264 (2008).
104 See SHACHAR, supra note 97, at 11.
105 Id. at 5–6.
106 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
107 See Williams, supra note 103, at 274.
108 See, e.g., BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE
OF MULTICULTURALISM (2002); ELHAM MANEA, WOMEN AND SHARIA LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE UK 111 (2016).
109 For instance, the organization “One Law for All” advocates for the eradication
of Sharia Councils and Muslim Arbitration Tribunals, and calls for “one secular law for all
and no Sharia.” One Law for All: Campaign Against Sharia law in Britain, ONE LAW FOR
ALL, http://onelawforall.org.uk/about [https://perma.cc/ESG4-5LFE].
98
99
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regarding applications of Islamic law that may violate civil rights
and suggests that the best way to ensure equal rights for all
citizens is to ban the application of religious law. For instance,
Professor Elham Manea falls decidedly among those scholars who
oppose the introduction of RJBs in secular contexts.110 She criticizes
religious legal pluralism advocates for viewing Islamic law as an
“expression of the universal principles of Islam,” and not as
“concrete religious laws and rules . . . which can violate human
dignity and human rights,” as can be seen in countries such as
“Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Afghanistan . . . .”111 Authors such
as Manea do not consider the societal context surrounding Islamic
RJBs and how that context influences RJBs’ interpretation of
religious law and religious litigants’ perspectives.112
Other scholars have documented how enforcement and
interpretation of Islamic law differs in varying societal contexts,
noting distinct differences in places like Saudi Arabia, which has
highly puritanical interpretations, and Indonesia, which has
“moderate, contemporary interpretations.”113 Societal context
also plays an important role in terms of the expectations and
desires religious people living in secular society have about
religious law. Surveys of Muslims living in Europe and the
United States find that “Muslims are quite satisfied with the
secular nature of European political regimes,” and that “they
engage in politics and the democratic process, utilizing
mainstream parties and institutions.”114 However, this “does not
mean that [Muslims] renounce Islamic principles and legal rules
to guide or structure their daily lives.”115
According to Professor Julie Macfarlane, Muslims’ desire
to utilize RJBs does not necessarily reflect either a particularly
high degree of religiosity or the desire for Islamic law to replace
or supersede secular law.116 In interviews with imams in the
United States and Canada, she found many of the Muslims who
came to the imams for a divorce did not “practice Islam in a
traditionally observant fashion.”117 The imams understood that
these individuals were “looking for affirmation or an absolution

See generally MANEA, supra note 108.
Id. at 111.
112 See Jocelyne Cesari, Foreword: Sharia and the Future of Western
Secularism, in DEBATING SHARIA, supra note 15, at 6.
113 Otto, supra note 81, at 615.
114 Cesari, supra note 112, at 6.
115 Id. (citing surveys led in Europe and the United States from 2007 to 2008).
116 Julie Macfarlane, Practising an ‘Islamic Imagination’: Islamic Divorce in
North America, in DEBATING SHARIA, supra note 15, at 53.
117 Id.
110
111
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that they . . . followed the ‘right’ course Islamically.”118 These
imams observed that “[e]ven if they are [otherwise] secular
[Muslims], they don’t want to mess with sensitive family
issues . . . they want to do it right.”119 Macfarlane further found
that respondents tended to marry and divorce according to both
civil and Islamic law and did “not want a set of parallel courts
for Islamic law” that would replace civil options.120
These three broad groups in the contemporary
scholarship—pro-multiculturalism, One Law for All, and
contextual studies of RJBs—have all made important
contributions, yet even taken together they leave key areas
unexplored. The first two, focused as they are on the question of
whether secular governments need to accommodate religious
RJBs, are limited by their choice to adopt the perspective of
secular governments. As a result, their arguments make little to
no consideration of whether, how, and why RJBs adapt
themselves to secular environments.
Even the aforementioned contextual studies cannot
capture the entire picture. While scholars like Manea cite Saudi
Arabian and Iranian RJBs to determine how RJBs would likely
act in secular contexts,121 the reality is that Islamic law within
the secular context takes on a wide variety of interpretations
and accommodations. Muslims living in secular countries are
“debating how they should relate to their tradition, what social
and gender norms they should adopt, and how they should deal
with the question of integration.”122 This debate is very much one
still in progress as Muslims continue to develop specific legal
interpretations for living as minorities in non-Muslim majority
countries (fiqh al-aqalliyyat).123
To date, a single monograph has looked more
systematically at RJBs. Professor Michael Broyde, in his book,
Sharia Tribunals, Rabbinical Courts, and Christian Panels,
focuses on the Jewish experience in the United States and the
Muslim experience in England.124 In his book, Broyde “explains
why religious communities and individuals are increasingly
Id.
Id.
120 Omar Sacirbey, Correction: Study Says U.S. Muslims Don’t Want Shariah,
Either, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/onfaith/correction-study-says-us-muslims-dont-want-Sharia-either/2012/01/31/gIQAB3H0
fQ_story.html [https://perma.cc/6CCM-UWQC].
121 See MANEA, supra note 108.
122 L. Clarke, Asking Questions About Sharia: Lessons from Ontario, in
DEBATING SHARIA, supra note 15, at 155.
123 Id.
124 BROYDE, supra note 5, at xxv.
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turning to private, faith-based dispute resolution” and “explain[s]
how it is that American law came to permit litigants to opt-out of
secular law and instead choose to resolve their disputes through
faith-based arbitration.”125 He identifies how faith-based
arbitration, especially the BDA, has developed in America and
England to meet the procedural justice norms of secular law.126
Yet this work, while significant, focuses solely on
arbitration bodies and does not focus on litigants’ influence on
RJBs. This last point is significant, as scholars have called for a
shift in legal pluralism studies to a focus on legal subjects
instead of the state, what they term “critical legal pluralism.”127
Critical legal pluralism “embraces a philosophical commitment
to the subjective construction of law by legal subjects.”128 The law
within critical legal pluralism “encompass[es] ‘how legal
subjects understand themselves and the law.’ For critical legal
pluralists, ‘law arises from, belongs to, and responds to
everyone.’”129 Religious laity (subjects of religious law) living in
secular settings develop expectations of religious law based on
the legal norms of the country in which they live. Accordingly,
religious courts tend to interpret religious law in ways that lend
themselves to these expectations.130
For critical legal pluralists, religious laity “shape and
produce law as much” as judges and mediators on religious
courts.131 According to Professors Martha-Marie Klienhans and
Roderick Macdonald, the flag-bearers of critical legal pluralism:
“Legal subjects . . . possess a transformative capacity that
enables them to produce legal knowledge and to fashion the very
structures of law that contribute to constituting their legal
subjectivity.”132 This methodology identifies religious people who
use RJBs as social and political agents who influence the
interpretations and development of religious law.
While religious laity act as agents in the development
and interpretation of religious law in a secular state, the state
still plays an important role in this socio-legal inquiry.133
Id. at xii.
Id. at 164, 177.
127 Fournier et al., supra note 100, at 338.
128 Id.
129 Id. (first quoting Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A. Macdonald, What
is a Critical Legal Pluralism?, 12 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 25, 36 (1997); then quoting
RODERICK ALEXANDER MACDONALD, LESSONS OF EVERYDAY LAW 8 (2002)).
130 See discussion infra Part III.
131 Fournier et al., supra note 100, at 338.
132 Id. at 399 (citing Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A. Macdonald, What
is a Critical Legal Pluralism?, 12 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 25, 38 (1997)).
133 Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A. Macdonald, What is a Critical Legal
Pluralism?, 12 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 25, 34–35 (1997).
125
126
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Specifically, the state still plays an important role on religious
courts’ conformity to secular procedural and social justice norms,
as RJBs rely on the state to maintain their jurisdiction and
enforce their judgments.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF RJBS: LEGAL PLURALISM AND
LIMITED JURISDICTION

The difference between RJBs that serve minority
populations and RJBs that serve majority populations in their
accommodation of secular norms hinges on four factors. These
four factors are: (1) the historical narrowing of their jurisdiction;
(2) the political environments that threaten their continued
existence; (3) civil courts’ judicial oversight of RJBs and RJBs’
reliance on civil courts to enforce decisions; and (4) the
expectations of litigants that RJBs uphold their civil rights,
especially as regards women’s rights. The influence of litigants’
expectations on RJB behavior finds some support in popular
constitutionalism.134 Likewise, possible explanations for the
motivations of RJBs to accommodate secular norms also finds
some resonance in James Wilson’s explanations of political
organization behavior.135
A.

Historical Development

The RJBs examined herein all emerge out of a historical
environment wherein RJBs were prominent—and in some
instances the exclusive—judicial bodies. The influence of the
Enlightenment led to a curtailment of the jurisdiction and
specific form of RJBs.136 Yet, the Enlightenment ideals in each
country also led to a valuing of religious and legal pluralism. As
detailed below, the RJBs have all undergone a narrowing of their
jurisdiction and now rely on a secular state to enforce their
decisions. The historical evolution of the RJBs has led to current
political and social implications. RJBs now exist in a political
environment wherein secularism dominates, resulting in
increased questioning of whether RJBs ought to exist.

134 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living
Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 597 (2009).
135 See generally WILSON, supra note 13.
136 See Ido Shahar, Legal Pluralism and the Study of Shari’a Courts, 15 ISLAMIC
L. & SOC’Y 112, 129–30 (2008).
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1. Evolution of Islamic and Jewish RJBs in Israel
For both the Sharia courts and the Rabbinical courts in
Israel, tensions exist between the religious courts and the secular
laws and courts of the state. Here, the question of judicial reform
and activism has often gone hand in hand with questions of
jurisdiction, which have themselves originated out of the tension
between the concurrent existence of religious courts and secular
courts and laws. This tension, however, did not begin with the
creation of the State of Israel. The tension can be traced as far
back as the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire and the
concurrent immigration of European Jews into Ottoman
territory, when a narrowing of Ottoman religious courts’
jurisdiction began. During the Tanzimat period, spanning the late
18th century up to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, “the
sultans enacted a series of governmental, administrative and
legal reforms which” can be understood as an attempt to
“transition to modernity.”137 The Ottoman Empire’s “transition to
modernity,” which was driven by the Enlightenment in Europe
and competition with Europe, primarily took the form of
secularization of governmental and legal structures.138
Pre-Tanzimat, minority subjects of the Ottoman Empire
were permitted to, and did, operate their own religious courts in
which they had jurisdiction over almost all matters, including
commercial matters and taxation (with the exception of “capital
crimes and issues pertaining to religious endowments”).139 The
Sharia courts handled all matters but also began to see their
jurisdiction limited during the Tanzimat era.140
The Tanzimat reforms in particular are understood as
the period that shifted the “historical balance between ‘secular’
law and [religious law].”141 These reforms included the
codification of law (as described earlier, some of which remain
enforced in Israel today), including family law, and the creation
of secular, civil courts, which functioned parallel to the Sharia
courts.142 This led to an erosion of the Sharia courts’ jurisdiction,
Id. at 129.
See Hakan Köni, Politics of Religion and Secularism in the Ottoman Empire;
14th to 20th Century: A Study, INT’L J. RES. SOC. SCI. 11, 13–15 (2013); see also Brian
Duignan, Enlightenment: European History, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/event/Enlightenment-European-history [https://perma.cc/TWB5-TRXJ]
(“The Enlightenment produced the first modern secularized theories of psychology and ethics.”).
139 Jacob M. Landau, Changing Patterns of Community Structures, with Special
Reference to Ottoman Egypt, in JEWS, TURKS, OTTOMANS: A SHARED HISTORY, FIFTEENTH
THROUGH THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 77, 86 (Avigdor Levy ed., 1st ed. 2002).
140 Id. at 86.
141 Shahar, supra note 136, at 130.
142 Id. at 129.
137
138
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such that the Sharia courts eventually only retained jurisdiction
over “matters relating to personal status.”143 This erosion led to
a weakening of the power of qadis (Sharia court judges).144
The Tanzimat reforms also increased secularization of
the Jewish community by significantly reducing the jurisdiction
of their Rabbinical courts (operating autonomously under the
millet system) down to only “marital and inheritance issues,”145
a drastic change from the broad jurisdiction they previously
enjoyed over almost all subject matters. This contributed to a
decline in the authority and utilization of the Jewish
community’s Rabbinical courts in various regions of the
empire.146 This implementation not only ultimately “reduced the
competence of the Jewish courts” but also diminished the power
and authority of local religious leadership.147
The transformation of the Rabbinical courts resulted
from several societal factors besides the Tanzimat reforms
themselves. For instance, many Ashkenazi immigrants of the
time viewed the Ottoman Empire as a safe haven from the vast
Enlightenment reforms occurring in their home countries and
immigrated to Ottoman territories in order to carve out enclaves
of Orthodoxy.148 The Ashkenazi Orthodox response to the
perceived threat of the Haskalah (the European Jewish
Enlightenment reform movement) “manifested itself in the
adoption of stringent positions on a wide range of aspects of
modern life . . . and a controlled, begrudging accommodation
with the changing realities.”149 For instance, in Jerusalem a
controversy emerged between the European Jewish
communities. Eastern European Jews, predominately Russian,
opposed an attempt to open a modern school. Their opposition
was based, at least in part, on “the struggle of traditional East
European Jewry against the establishment of government
schools . . . ”150 They viewed themselves “as part of a worldwide
front defended by the Orthodox, those faithful to Jewish

Id. at 130.
See Ramadan, supra note 4, at 99–100.
145 Landau, supra note 139, at 86.
146 Id. at 86–87.
147 Daniel J. Schroeter, The Changing Relationship Between the Jews and the
Arab Middle East and the Ottoman State in the Nineteenth Century, in JEWS, TURKS,
OTTOMANS: A SHARED HISTORY, FIFTEENTH THROUGH THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 88, 96
(Avigdor Levy ed., 2002).
148 Israel Bartal: From “Kollel” to “Neighborhood”: Revisiting the Pre-Zionist
Ashkenazi Community in Nineteenth-Century Palestine, in OTTOMAN AND TURKISH
JEWRY: COMMUNITY AND LEADERSHIP 203, 208 (Aron Rodrigue ed., 1992).
149 Id. at 207.
150 Id.
143
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values.”151 They viewed Palestine as the “last stronghold of
traditional society still unsullied by the pernicious influence of
European Haskalah in all its manifestation.”152 While this
struggle emerged in the Ottoman period, it has had long-lasting
effects on the Orthodox Jewish control of the Rabbinical courts,
as further described below.153
By the time Palestine fell under the British Mandate
both the Sharia and Rabbinical courts had their previously
almost unlimited jurisdictions narrowed to the area of personal
status law, although they had exclusive jurisdiction in these
matters.154 In addition to the significant changes to the
Rabbinical and Sharia courts, related to changes in sovereignty,
the British Mandate authorities introduced a number of
structural changes that have impacted the courts’ contemporary
rulings. In particular, as part of an endeavor to align the
procedural norms of the religious courts to those of English law,
the Mandate authorities introduced courts of appeals into the
Rabbinical and Sharia courts.155 Neither Islamic Law nor
Halakha (Jewish Law) formerly had conceptualized such a
construction.156 As will be further explored below, these courts of
appeals have played a major role in the reform of the Sharia
courts in the modern period.157
The creation of the State of Israel significantly affected
the relationship of both the Sharia and Rabbinical courts to their
sources of law. Although the Israeli State was founded by
secular, European Zionists, Orthodox authorities worked prior
to the establishment of the state to establish the authority of the
Rabbinical courts.158 A status quo agreement between the
European Zionist and Orthodox factions was reached a year
before the creation of the state regarding the position of Judaism
in the soon to be state.159 The agreement “gave the Orthodox
authorities a monopoly on personal status issues” and has led to
the strength of the Rabbinical courts today.160 The Zionist
movement, while secular, recognized that “religious tradition
Id. at 208.
Id.
153 See discussion of the current political environment in Israel infra Section II.B.
154 Ramadan, supra note 4, at 88–89, 98–100.
155 See M. Chigier, The Rabbinical Courts in the State of Israel, 2 ISR. L. REV.
147, 174–77 (1967).
156 Imen Gallala-Arndt, Personal Status Law in Israel: Disputes Between
Religious and Secular Courts, in CHANGING GOD’S LAW: THE DYNAMICS OF MIDDLE
EASTERN FAMILY LAW 204, 206 (Nadjma Yassari ed., 2016).
157 See infra Section III.C.
158 EDELMAN, supra note 34, at 50–51.
159 Id.
160 Gallala-Arndt, supra note 156, at 206.
151
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‘provided the affective ties of unity needed by the modern nationbuilders.’”161 The Rabbinical courts achieved a major win, further
guaranteeing their position, with the passing of the Rabbinical
Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law of 1953, which
“recognized the Orthodox religious realm’s monopoly on matters
of marriage and divorce for Jews.”162 This has had lasting
impacts on the ability of the Rabbinical courts to withstand
reform, including attempts by factions of the Knesset to curtail
the Rabbinical courts’ jurisdiction.163
The most significant change the Sharia courts witnessed
with the establishment of the State of Israel was the shift from
operating under a Muslim sovereign and serving a majority
population, to operating under a secular Jewish sovereign and
serving a minority population. This shift especially impacted the
role of the qadi (Islamic court judge). Historically, jurisprudential
development and reform (ijtihad) fell to specially qualified jurists
(mujtahid) that the head of state designated.164 With the creation
of the State of Israel, this task fell to the qadis.165 For many years,
however, the qadis on the Israeli Sharia courts were ill equipped
to fulfill this task due to issues with appointment process, as with
the establishment of the Israeli State, and consequently, the
Muslim population lost control over the appointment of qadis.166
Per the 1961 Qadi Law, “Qadis are salaried state
officials . . . nominated by the President of the State of Israel.”167
As a result, many qadis in Israel lacked the necessary
legal education and experience for the position.168 This led to
narrow opinions from the Sharia courts that could not meet the
needs of the Muslim population facing questions of modernity
and norms of the state and provide for constitutionally protected
rights.169 However, the Qadi Law of 2002 now requires that qadis
“have a significant religious education in Sharia or Islamic
studies, or have considerable experience in a legal profession.”170
Id. at 207.
Id.
163 See Fournier et al., supra note 100, at 341.
164 See Wael B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?, 16 INT’L J. MIDDLE E.
STUD. 3, 13, 24 (1984).
165 See Moussa Abou Ramadan, Judicial Activism of the Shari’ah Appeals Court
in Israel (1994–2001): Rise and Crisis, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 254, 271 (2003).
166 See Ramadan, supra note 4, at 88, 90–91.
167 Gallala-Arndt, supra note 156, at 209.
168 See Ramadan, supra note 165, at 259 n.24, 291.
169 See id. at 293.
170 Gallala-Arndt, supra note 156, at 209. Education of judges has also played
an important role in Jewish and Islamic RJBs in the United States and England. Both
sets of RJBs have introduced requirements for panels to include judges with religious
law and civil law training.
161
162
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This has led to qadis expanding their traditionally strictly
judicial role to include the role of legal scholarship and
development. The primary means by which they have done this
is through the Sharia Court of Appeals, which issues legal
circulars.171 As discussed more extensively below, this has led to
a court better able to “adjust the legal norm to the changing
circumstances of the time.”172
The Sharia Court of Israel has accomplished most of this
legal adaptation via its use of classical Sunni Islamic legal
scholarship. This scholarship is divided into four denominations
or legal schools of thought (madhab). Traditionally, Muslim
judges issue opinions based on the legal reasoning and
conclusions of a specific school. In the Israeli Sharia courts,
however, the judges’ source of law is much broader. They rely on
Ottoman family law (the codification of primarily one of the
schools of thought),173 draw upon all four Sunni schools of thought
(takhayyur)174 and look to modern Islamic Laws from Muslim
majority states (particularly those in the Middle East).175
Importantly, they apply the binding opinions of the Sharia
Appeals court, which did not exist historically. The application of
binding appellate decisions is notably also used by the American
Jewish judicial bodies and the English Islamic judicial bodies.
Likewise, the MAT also approaches classical Sunni Islamic legal
schools of thought with the methodology of takhayyur, which
allows judges to draw on opinions from any of the four schools.176
2. Evolution of RJBs in England
RJBs in England have also experienced a historical
evolution of narrowing jurisdiction. Prior to the Reformation,
church courts in England enjoyed extensive jurisdiction over what
would be considered today as “secular contract law.”177 These
church courts serve as the historical backdrop to England’s
modern religious arbitration.178 In pre-modern England, “religious
authorities frequently provided routes to justice that were an
alternative to the state courts.”179 While these “religious courts
See Ramadan, supra note 165, at 284–88.
Layish, supra note 26, at 214.
173 Id. at 174–76.
174 Id. at 174, 192–93, Emon, supra note 82, at 397.
175 Layish, supra note 26, at 187–90.
176 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 183.
177 Walter, supra note 6, at 506 (citing R.B. OUTHWAITE, THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE ENGLISH ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS, 1500–1860, at 15 (2006)).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 505.
171
172
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exercised compulsory jurisdiction,” they overlapped with modern
religious arbitration “in that they competed directly with civil
courts.”180 The parallel nature of the church courts was such that
in the fourteenth century, “church courts had adopted the practice
of hearing appeals from the common-law courts.”181
This jurisdiction was “in direct competition with the royal
courts” and can be understood as a circumstance of “quasi-arbitral
jurisdiction in contract matters.”182 Within the sixteenth and
seventeenth century, the jurisdiction of church courts included
“matrimonial, probate, tithe, and defamation cases.”183 This
jurisdiction was enjoyed via “the doctrine of fidei laesio, or breach
of faith.”184 Such that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was not based
on failure to perform, but rather, that “he had breached his oath
to perform.”185 Within the sixteenth century, the common law
courts also “found ways of exercising jurisdiction over these
disputes.”186 In a similar vein, from the mid-sixteenth to the midseventeenth century, the church heard an explosion of slander
cases and tithe related cases (as the entire population was
required to pay tithes).187 The jurisdiction of the church courts
were severely curtailed in the English Revolution, but similar to
the Sharia courts in the late-Ottoman Empire, were able to
maintain jurisdiction over “matrimonial and probate disputes
until 1857.”188 With the English Revolution, the church lost
jurisdiction over “all that is now considered ‘secular.’”189
This historical legacy continues to be negotiated in the
modern era via the Arbitration Act of 1996190 and non-binding
mediation. While the Arbitration Act is not specifically intended
for use by religious bodies, nothing in the Act prohibits its use
by RJBs (although the Act limits the kinds of disputes to mostly
commercial disputes).191 Much like the Federal Arbitration Act
in the United States, the act “limits the conditions under which
either party may appeal . . . appeals are allowed on grounds that

Id. at 505–06.
Id. at 506.
182 Id. at 507, 507 n.25 (quoting WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 131 (vol. 12 3d reprt. 1977)).
183 Id. at 506.
184 Id. at 506 n.16.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 506.
188 Id. at 507.
189 Id.
190 See Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23 (U.K.) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
1996/23/contents [https://perma.cc/R4RQ-GA6P].
191 BOWEN, supra note 42, at 155.
180
181
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the procedures followed were unfair or misleading.”192 As will be
discussed below, however, the use of the Arbitration Act by RJBs
especially Islamic RJBs, has led to calls for legislative action to
limit Islamic arbitration and mediation in England.
3. Evolution of RJBs in the United States
Although the U.S. historical experience with religious
courts departs from the English experience in that the United
States never had a state religion, it shares a similar background
with regard to the historical role of church courts in the colonial
period. Within the earlier American experience of religious courts,
there was “competition between state- and church-sponsored
dispute resolution,” as well as areas in which no “civil alternatives”
existed to the “church dispute resolution.”193 Both countries’
religious courts were also likely impacted by Enlightenment ideals
regarding freedom of thought and religion on religious courts.194
Within the American colonial experience, a variety of
churches were established with different states having their own
churches.195 This laid the groundwork for a culture of valuing a
diversity of religious choices. While a significant portion of
Israel’s early founders were Orthodox Jews seeking to escape the
Enlightenment, America’s founders were seeking to preserve the
Enlightenment ideals of freedom of thought and religion.196 Of
particular significance to the American experience was the
passing of the First Amendment in 1789, “which prevented an
established church from reaching the same position in national
American life as it had in Britain.”197 The variety of churches also
led to judicial diversity in the colonial period.198
During the colonial period, churches were frequently the
only courts available and a culture of utilizing alternative

Id.
Walter, supra note 6, at 509.
194 See Lynn Hunt, The Enlightenment and the Origins of Religious Toleration,
DUTCH-BELGIAN SOC’Y FOR EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD.: 4 BURGERHART LECTURES
(Oct. 25, 2011), https://achttiendeeeuw.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/hunt.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8HHL-FSGA].
195 Walter, supra note 6, at 509 (“In colonial America, various colonies had
established churches.”).
196 American
Government:
Foundations
of
American
Government,
USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/gov/2.asp [https://perma.cc/C8BV-GZJN]
(“The American founders were well versed in the writings of the philosophes, whose ideas
influenced the shaping of the new country. Thomas Jefferson, George Washington,
James Madison, and others took the brave steps of creating a government based on the
Enlightenment values of liberty, equality, and a new form of justice.”).
197 Walter, supra note 6, at 509.
198 See id. at 510.
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dispute resolution developed.199 For instance, in 1635 a Boston
community issued an ordinance requiring that “no congregation
members could litigate unless there had been a prior effort at
arbitration.”200 Religious belief and convenience supported this
culture of turning towards alternative dispute resolution.
According to Nicholas Walter:
The civil courts functioned as a “back-up” when the civil power was
needed—for example, to arrest persons and attach property. The
parallel jurisdiction of the civil and church courts is a feature of
modern-day arbitration, and it is not surprising that the other
characteristics that we often associate with modern arbitration—
speed, informality and inexpensiveness—were present in religious
arbitration before American independence.201

Religious arbitration within the American Jewish community
has taken on a number of different forms, including the preWorld War I Kehillah tribunals and the creation of different
arbitral bodies for the Ultra-Orthodox, Orthodox, and
Conservative communities.202 Of particular significance to the
lasting success of Jewish arbitration was the “passage of the
Municipal Court Act of 1915, which made their judgments
legally binding.”203 Other jurisdictions passed similar laws in the
early 20th century, making Jewish arbitration viable in multiple
jurisdictions.204 The historic and contemporary popularity of
religious arbitration within minority and off shoot religious
communities reflects the religious requirements of those
communities to comply with religious law. As will be discussed
in Part III, these RJBs have taken several steps to ensure
compliance with both religious and civil law.205
The current form of Jewish judicial bodies arises out of
the historical experience of these courts in the United States.
While they have existed in the United States for over a hundred
years, it is only recently that these courts have found “their
footing in the American legal system.”206 Some of the earlier
difficulty is likely attributable to anti-Semitic sentiments in the
American public at large and as a result, within the American
judiciary. During the early period of Rabbinical courts in the
United States, “secular courts were uncomfortable upholding
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

See id. at 510–11.
Id. at 511 (quoting JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 23 (1983)).
Id.
See id. at 514.
Id.
See id.
See infra Section III.A–C.
BROYDE, supra note 5, at 138.
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and enforcing arbitral decisions” of Jewish courts, viewing these
decisions as entailing “foreign, inaccessible substantive and
procedural law.”207 The situation today is dramatically different.
This historical experience has translated into the modern
use of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) by RJBs, such as the
BDA. Like the U.K.’s Arbitration Act of 1996, the FAA is also
centered on contract and “makes it clear that agreements to
arbitrate are valid” with a few limitations.208 The FAA reflects
“the law’s long-held preference for courts honoring private
agreements between parties.”209
Also similar to the UK’s arbitration act, an arbitration
award may be vacated “where the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means.”210 Generally, the FAA does
not permit a substantive review of arbitration awards.211 Case law
has developed, however, such that a court may “vacate arbitral
rulings that are contrary to public policy, and some courts have
gone further to hold that an award may be vacated if its substance
amounts to manifest disregard for the law.”212 While courts rarely
vacate arbitration awards on these grounds, RJBs demonstrate
an awareness of the procedural requirements necessary to have
their decisions upheld.213
In all three countries, the historical relationship to
religious courts has resulted in an environment which values
legal pluralism with the option to resolve disputes before RJBs.
Because of the historical development of secular law in each
country, the RJBs have limited jurisdiction and compete with civil
courts. The current political climate in these countries, however,
reflects a growing unease with RJBs.
B.

Hostile Political Environments

Opposition to religious courts in all three jurisdictions has
centered on gender politics; in particular, opposition has coalesced
around the perceived threat of Islamic and Jewish courts to
Id.
Id. at 116, 179.
209 Id. at 116.
210 Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L No. 68-405, ch. 213,§ 10, 43 Stat. 883, 885
(1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. V 2018)); BROYDE, supra
note 5, at 119.
211 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 119.
212 Id.; see also Walter, supra note 6, at 522 (“The New York Supreme Court
noted in Berg v. Berg that an arbitral award could be overturned on public policy grounds
if a provision of it violated a state statute or regulation. In this regard, however, religious
arbitral awards are simply like secular arbitral awards.”).
213 See Yechiel (Gene C.) Colman, Ensuring Enforceability of Beis Din’s Judgements,
JEWISH L. BLOG, https://www.jlaw.com/Articles/beisdin3.html [https://perma.cc/5QU5-BDML].
207
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women’s equal rights. These politics have focused on divorce
rights in both faiths, as in both traditional interpretations of
Jewish and Islamic law women do not share the same rights as
men to unilateral divorce.214 Furthermore, the vast majority of
issues that RJBs address deal with family law, especially related
to divorce, i.e. custody, distribution of property, etc.215
The political reaction to Islamic arbitration and mediation
has been more tempered in England than the United States. In
England, political action has mostly taken the form of calls for
legislative limitations on arbitration and mediation. For instance,
in 2012, “the House of Lords gave a second reading to the
Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality Bill).”216 While the
bill is facially neutral, comments on the bill indicate that the
primary concern is the perceived unequal treatment of women in
Islamic arbitration and mediation, especially with regard to
divorce.217 Lord Carlile of Berriew expressed similar concerns and
“suggested that the House might usefully consider whether
England and Wales should adopt at least some of the provisions
of the Ontario Family Statute Law Amendment Act 2009,” which
banned all religious arbitration in reaction to the Ontario Sharia
Debate discussed earlier in this article.218
Were such an amendment passed, it would significantly
limit the ability of RJBs to issue rulings based on religious law.
Such an amendment would require that “any decision made by a
third party in arbitration or other proceedings ha[s] no legal effect
unless exclusively in accordance” with the laws of the
jurisdiction.219 The Bishop of Manchester raised some concern
about the impact such legislation would have on Jewish courts.220
The debate on the bill represents lingering political concerns about
Muslim judicial policies in particular. While the Government
determined that existing law largely addressed the concerns of the
proposed amendment and therefore was unnecessary, concerns
about the role of Islamic law in England continue.221
In the United States, political action has frequently taken
the form of outright “Sharia bans,” which have resulted in state
legislatures passing legislation banning the application of Islamic

214
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law in “their state legislatures and courts.”222 The first such
legislation originated in Oklahoma in November 2010 with its
“popularly-ratified ‘Save our State’ Amendment to the Oklahoma
Constitution.”223 This legislation has been prompted by “imagined
legal worries” and a desire to “head[ ] off a problem before it
started.”224 Although a federal court “found that the Sharia law
provisions of the amendment are unconstitutional” for its specific
targeting of one religion, more than a dozen states have passed
an alternative version directed at “foreign law” to accomplish the
desired effect of banning Islamic law.225
This legislation has prompted concern within the Jewish
community about the potential impact it may have on religious
arbitration. The passing of this legislation led Jewish organizations,
such as the Agudath and the Orthodox Union, to join with the
American Civil Liberties Union, among others, as signatories to
letters sent to state legislatures to encourage them to reject antiSharia legislation.226 One such letter reads:
The impact of this legislation goes well beyond prohibiting religious
tribunal resolution of monetary or ministerial disputes . . . . It would
apparently prohibit the courts from looking to key documents of church,
synagogue or mosque governance—religious law—to resolve disputes
about the ownership of a house of worship, selection and discipline of
ministers, and church governance.227

While the full impact of such legislation on religious arbitration
remains to be seen, there is little indication that sentiments
towards Muslims or Islamic law in the United States have
warmed since their passing. In 2017, anti-Muslim and antiSharia movements continued to gain momentum as hate crimes
and “anti-sharia” rallies increased.228
In Israel, political concerns about RJBs have also
centered on women’s rights in both Judaism and Islam. This has
222 John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Who Governs the Family? Marriage as a
New Test Case of Overlapping Jurisdictions, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 321, 330 (2013).
223 Id.
224 Id. at 331.
225 See Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1207 (W.D. Okla. 2013) (citing
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012)).
226 Ron Kampeas, Anti-Sharia Laws Stir Concerns That Halachah Could be Next,
JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Apr. 28, 2011), https://www.jta.org/2011/04/28/life-religion/antisharia-laws-stir-concerns-that-halachah-could-be-next [https://perma.cc/HC8D-NQ4Q].
227 Id.
228 See Brian Levin, Islamophobia in America: Rise in Hate Crimes Against
Muslims Shows What Politicians Say Matters, NEWSWEEK (July 21, 2017), http://
www.newsweek.com/islamophobia-america-rise-hate-crimes-against-muslims-proveswhat-politicians-640184 [https://perma.cc/75FE-L5HD]; David DeKok & Tom James,
Protesters Rally Against Islamic Law in Dozens of U.S. Cities, REUTERS (June 10, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-islam-protests/protesters-rally-against-islamiclaw-in-dozens-of-u-s-cities-idUSKBN1910RC [https://perma.cc/UV83-JHV7].
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resulted in both legislative and judicial action. The Israeli
Supreme Court, both as the highest appellate court and as the
High Court of Justice (HCJ),229 has issued rulings curtailing the
jurisdiction of the Rabbinical and Sharia courts.230 As described
earlier, the Knesset has previously taken steps to limit the
jurisdiction of the religious courts through the narrowing of
existing jurisdiction and the creation of concurrent legislation.231
In addition to the historic role of Orthodox Judaism to the
cultural identity of Israel, political positioning of the Orthodox
subculture in Israel has also led to unwillingness in the
Rabbinical courts to accommodate the secular legal norms of the
state. Israel is a parliamentary democracy in which coalition
governments have long been a defining feature.232 Due to these
coalitions, the Orthodox Jewish community has often wielded
significant political weight.233 Religious parties have become a
critical element to almost all coalitions and “[a]s a result, every
Government since 1959 has explicitly committed itself, in the
formal coalition agreement which established the Government,
to maintaining the religious status quo” agreement, which
preserves the Rabbinical courts.234 The subculture of Orthodox
Judaism in Israel is centered on Halachah and disputes often
emerge due to contrary legal interpretations.235 One component
of this subculture is the religious Zionists who have aligned
themselves with the National Religious Party (NRP).236 Another
component is the “Torah Sages, the rabbis who have earned
great prestige through their ability to interpret Halachah,” most
of whom are not aligned with the NRP.237 The Torah sages
suspect the religious Zionist leadership “of surrendering
Halachic principles for ‘mere’ political advantage.”238 To combat
these suspicions, the religious Zionists “are quite rigid on

229 When acting as the High the Court of Justice, the Supreme Court “deals
with matters involving issues of justice which do not fall under the jurisdiction of any
other court.” KNESSET, Lexicon of Terms—The High Court of Justice (2003)
https://knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/bagatz_eng.htm [https://perma.cc/U8XM-CQNX].
230 Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Expressions of Legal Pluralism in Israel: The
Interaction Between the High Court of Justice and Rabbinical Courts in Family Matters
and Beyond, in JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES XIII: JEWISH FAMILY LAW IN THE
STATE OF ISRAEL 185 (M.D.A. Freeman ed., 2002) [hereinafter JEWISH FAMILY LAW].
231 See supra Section I.A.1.
232 EDELMAN, supra note 34, at 52.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 68–70.
236 Id. at 70.
237 Id.
238 Id.
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matters squarely within traditional Judaic concerns—for
example, marriage and divorce.”239
Furthermore,
religious
coercion
regarding
the
appointment of judges to the Rabbinical courts remains a major
political issue in Israel. For instance, in late December 2017, the
governing coalition of Likud, Shas, and United Torah Judaism
(major political parties in Israel) reached an agreement that
their representative to appoint Rabbinical court judges would
come from one of the two ultra-Orthodox parties.240 Despite
campaign promises that he would fight religious coercion, Yesh
Atid’s leader, Yair Lapid, also supported the appointment “of an
ultra-Orthodox lawmaker to the committee that appoints judges
to Israel’s rabbinical courts.”241 In doing so, he “forced two [of his
own] party[’s]” representatives to step down from candidacy.242
Through these kinds of political alliances, the ultra-Orthodox
and Orthodox factions of Israel have maintained control over the
appointment of Rabbinical court judges and perpetuate rigid
interpretations of religious law in the Rabbinical courts.
C.

Civil Court Pressure

RJBs exist within larger secular judicial frameworks that
require that they meet certain procedural rules and uphold civil
rights, which require RJBs to accommodate these requirements
if they want their decisions upheld. RJBs that represent
religious minority populations exist more precariously within
the society and possess less autonomy in the enforcement of
their awards. Due to the political power of the Orthodox Jewish
lawmakers in Israel, the Rabbinical courts in Israel (which
uphold Orthodox interpretations of Jewish law), can essentially
disregard the Supreme Court of Israel.
1. The Rabbinical Courts’ Defiance of Judicial Review
The Israeli Supreme Court acting as the High Court of
Justice affirmed its supremacy and jurisdiction over the
Rabbinical courts in two high-profile cases, the Lev case and the
Bavli case.243 Prior to these cases, “[t]he assumption was that the
Rabbinical courts would . . . apply religious law to each and
Id.
Aaron Rabinowitz, Despite Election Promise, Yair Lapid to Support ultraOrthodox Candidate for Rabbinical Court Panel, HAARETZ (Dec. 23, 2017, 10:45 PM),
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.830786 [https://perma.cc/N285-EAXT].
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 230, at 197.
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every matter which arose during the course of the hearing,
including matters which exceeded the scope of the issues of
personal status.”244 Read together, these rulings “lead to the
application of the general civil law to the Rabbinical courts in all
matters, save in matters of personal status.”245 But the
Rabbinical courts met the Bavli decision with open hostility. In
response, they convened emergency meetings “on how to handle
the new ruling . . . and religious leaders stated that rabbinical
courts would not abide by it.”246 In the line of cases following the
decision, the Rabbinical courts have refused to apply it. The
Rabbinical courts display a confidence and independence absent
from RJBs representing minority populations.
2. The Sharia Courts’ Responsiveness to Judicial
Review
The Supreme Court of Israel has asserted its jurisdiction
over the Sharia courts in multiple cases. Unlike in the case of
the Rabbinical courts, the Supreme Court has not imposed the
application of civil law on the Sharia courts, but rather, has
narrowed the Sharia courts’ jurisdiction.247 In a custody case
before the Sharia Court of Appeals involving a Muslim father
and a Christian mother, the court ruled that as under Islamic
Law, religious identity of a minor is determined patrilineally;
the child was a Muslim and Islamic Law required custody be
granted to the Muslim parent.248 The Supreme Court, however,
ruled that in custody matters involving parents of different
religions, “the Sharia courts lack jurisdiction.”249
Similarly, in a case regarding paternity of an illegitimate
child, a civil district court rejected the case “in limine on ground
of lack of competence, since paternity and maintenance are
matters of personal status and fell, at the time, within the sole
jurisdiction of the Sharia court.”250 The case was then appealed
to the Supreme Court. The Court held that the child was
“entitled to benefit from ‘civil paternity’ that is, biological,
natural paternity.”251 The Court framed its ruling in terms of
subject-matter jurisdiction, stating:
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Where the [Sharia] Court cannot and will not exercise its jurisdiction,
and consequently denies, even if indirectly, rights that a Moslem has
earned according to the law of the land, namely the civil law, the
Order-in-Council should not be interpreted as giving sole jurisdiction
to the religious Court, while denying the civil systems jurisdiction.252

The Court, in framing its decision took care to recognize that the
Court was not compelling the Sharia court to apply “laws that
are against its religious doctrine.”253
The Sharia courts responded to this narrowing of their
jurisdiction via internal reform, especially within the Sharia
Court of Appeals. The Sharia Court of Appeals, in an initiative led
by the President of the Court of Appeals, issued a series of
circulars leading to reform in the Sharia courts’ judgments.254 This
response to the Supreme Court’s judicial review shows sincere
concern over further erosion to their jurisdiction.
3. The Arbitral RJBs’ Reliance on Civil Court
Enforcement
RJBs in England and the United States mostly operate
as arbitral bodies and depend on civil courts to enforce their
decisions. All other RJBs in England and the United States act
as informal mediation and advisory bodies that issue nonbinding opinions. The BDA is the most prominent Jewish RJB
in the United States and the MAT is the most prominent Islamic
RJB in England.255 Because they operate as arbitral bodies that
rely upon civil courts to enforce their decisions, both the BDA
and the MAT have deliberately modeled their procedural rules
after the procedural rules of the civil courts.256 Because they
operate as arbitral bodies, they rely upon civil courts to enforce
their decisions. Although distinct rules of procedure exist in
Jewish and Islamic law, the BDA and MAT utilize innovative
methods to ensure that their arbitration procedures meet the
requirements of their countries’ respective arbitration acts and
the requirements of their respective religious law.257
The MAT and the BDA demonstrate an explicit
consciousness of the secular legal system in which they operate.
On the MAT website, it differentiates itself from other Islamic
RJBs in England by highlighting its ability to “adher[e] to the
252
253
254
255

Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 230, at 203.
Id. at 202.
SHAHAR, supra note 28, at102.
See BROYDE, supra note 5, at 138, 177, 260; see also Broyde et al., supra note

6, at 36–37.
256
257

See BROYDE, supra note 5, at 141–45, 179–81.
Id. at 179.
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English Legal System whilst still preserving . . . practices of
Islamic Sacred Law.”258 Likewise, the BDA in the introduction to
its procedural rules states: “The Beth Din of America adjudicates
disputes in a manner consistent with secular law requirements
for binding arbitration so that the resolution will be enforceable
in the civil courts of the United States of America, and the
various states therein.”259 Failure to comply with the legally
mandated procedural standards of their respective arbitration
acts “can serve as grounds for vacating the arbitration award.”260
Arbitral RJBs in the United States have focused their
concern on meeting procedural requirements of the FAA due to
the current standard of review for arbitration decisions. Per the
FAA, civil courts do not differentiate between secular,
commercial arbitration and religious arbitration, simply
treating them all as arbitration.261 Therefore, enforcement of
awards from religious arbitration “avoids any excessive
entanglement with religious doctrine because the courts, when
enforcing arbitration awards, are instructed not to investigate
the merits of the dispute between the parties.”262 In recent years,
the Supreme Court has expanded the “deference and autonomy
granted to arbitration tribunals,”263 although it has maintained
that “a substantive waiver of federal civil rights [in arbitration
agreements] will not be upheld.”264
Civil courts may vacate arbitration awards that “seriously
conflict with the law,”265 either in the form of “a substantive
waiver of civil rights,” a violation of “public policy” 266 or a
demonstration of “manifest disregard of the law.”267 A violation of
258 About Us: History, MUSLIM ARB. TRIBUNAL, http://www.matribunal.com/
history.php [https://perma.cc/HQW8-XUL9].
259 RULES AND PROCEDURES, BETH DIN OF AMERICA (2013), http://s589827416.
onlinehome.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/X28V-67XV].
260 Michael A. Helfand, Between Law and Religion: Procedural Challenges to
Religious Arbitration Awards, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 141, 144 (2015).
261 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012 & Supp. V 2018) (referring to arbitration
and arbitrators generally without categorization).
262 Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 508 (2013).
263 Id. at 506 (citing the following cases, which enlarge “the scope of the Federal
Arbitration Act”: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Rent-A-Center,
W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,
559 U.S. 662 (2010)).
264 Walter, supra note 6, at 543–44 (quoting 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556
U.S. 247, 273 (2009)). In the Southern District of Indiana, a judge noted that the correct
remedy for a waiver of rights was after the arbitration action had concluded, not before.
Easterly v. Heritage Christian Sch., Inc., No. 1:08-cv-1714-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 2750099,
at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009).
265 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 217.
266 Walter, supra note 6, at 543–44 (citing 14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 273).
267 Jason P. Steed, Appealing Arbitration Awards and the Circuit Split over
“Manifest Disregard of the Law”, A.B.A. (May 10, 2016), http://apps.americanbar.org/
litigation/committees/appellate/articles/spring2016-0516-appealing-arbitration-awards-
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“public policy” within an arbitration award may also result in a
civil court vacating the arbitration award. In these instances,
courts will generally not enforce the arbitration award on the
basis “that the waiver of substantive rights is not merely a matter
of private contract, but implicates broader societal interests that
ought not be permitted to be abrogated through private
agreements.”268 Some American civil courts have extended this
principle to vacate arbitration decisions “that conflict with
broader, but not strictly legal policy concerns.”269
Thus far, the BDA and the MAT approach to crafting
arbitration procedural rules that meet all the procedural
requirements of their respective arbitration acts has led to
success. Civil courts in the United States “have never overturned
a BDA-issued arbitration award” and the MAT has met similar
success in England.270
D.

Litigants’ Social Expectations

The expectations of religious practitioners also impact
the willingness of RJBs to accommodate secular norms. Both the
BDA and the MAT indicate sensitivity to the desires of their
litigants. The MAT states: “where appropriate, that members of
the Tribunal have responsibility for ensuring this [is] in the
interests of the parties to the proceedings and in the wider public
interest.”271 Likewise, the BDA rules allow for disputes where
the parties explicitly adopt a “choice of law” provision and
“accept such a choice of law clause as providing the rules of
decision governing the decision of the panel to the fullest extent
permitted by Jewish law.”272
Religious laity living in these countries are aware of their
rights under secular laws and, in some instances, come to expect
preservation of those rights by RJBs. This is particularly true
regarding women’s rights.273 Both Jewish and Muslim women
have initiated movements calling for their equal treatment
circuit-split-manifest-disregard-law.html [https://perma.cc/U77Q-WPCV] (describing
“manifest disregard of the law” as a “common-law ground for vacatur” over which the
circuits are currently split) (citing Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349,
355 (5th Cir. 2009)).
268 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 217.
269 Id. (emphasis in original) (citing E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine
Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 63 (2000)).
270 Broyde et al., supra note 6, at 36–37.
271 About Us: Procedure Rules of Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, MUSLIM ARB.
TRIBUNAL, http://www.matribunal.com/rules.php [https://perma.cc/2UA4-5WUH].
272 RULES AND PROCEDURES § 3(D), at 5, BETH DIN OF AMERICA (2013), http://s5898
27416.onlinehome.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQJ3-TJER].
273 See generally Fournier et al., supra note 100.
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under religious law.274 These women often seek change within
religious law itself and call upon RJBs to support them in ruling
in more equitable ways. These expectations are especially
important for the BDA and the MAT, as the majority of cases
before them are divorce cases, which have particular
implications for women’s rights in Jewish and Islamic law.275
As in the Ontario Sharia Debate, Muslim women have
often led the charge for more equal treatment under religious
law. In her research on Muslim women, Cassandra Blachin,
Chair of the Muslim Women’s Network, found that Muslim
women “want greater financial autonomy and security, a fairer
division of property reflecting their contribution to the family’s
finances, freedom of mobility and equality in decision-making, a
monogamous relationship, and, should mutual understanding
break down, then equal access to divorce.”276
Some legal scholars have also misinterpreted Muslim
women’s interest in preserving their civil rights. For instance, in
England, at least one study has shown that “less than half” of
Muslim women who married “a partner domiciled in England
had registered their marriages according to civil law, meaning
that the largest group of women in [the] sample were in effect
unmarried according to English family law.”277 Other legal
scholars have interpreted this data to show that British Muslims
“intentionally choose to avoid using state law,” but studies show
that the majority of “women had in fact expected their religious
marriages to be registered in accordance with the Marriage
Acts,” and thus they intended to enjoy the protections of civil
marriage.278 In those instances where these women then seek a
divorce, they are shocked to learn that they do not have the
protections of civil marriage.279
At the same time, motivations for utilizing religious
arbitration and mediation often derive from a religious
conviction that a religious divorce is necessary to remarry, and
274 See Asifa Quraishi & Najeeba Syeed-Miller, No Altars: A Survey of Islamic
Family Law in the United States, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW:
PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM 177, 183–85. (Lynn Welchman ed., 2004); see also SUSAN
ARANOFF & RIVKA HAUT, THE WED-LOCKED AGUNOT: ORTHODOX JEWISH WOMEN
CHAINED TO DEAD MARRIAGES 1, 9 (2015); Fournier et al., supra note 100, at 337, 339.
275 See Fournier et al., supra note 100, at 349; see also SAMIA BANO, MUSLIM
WOMEN AND SHARI’AH COUNCILS: TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY AND
LAW 232–34 (1st ed. 2012).
276 BANO, supra note 275, at 234 (citing Cassandra Balchin, Negotiating Bliss,
OPENDEMOCRACY (Mar. 8, 2010), https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/cassandra-balchin/
negotiating-bliss [https://perma.cc/9NFS-TB35].
277 Id. at 160.
278 Id. at 160–61.
279 Id. at 161–62.
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that civil divorce alone is insufficient. In order to obtain a
religious divorce, Muslim women often must petition an Islamic
judicial body to rule in her favor,280 as under classical
interpretations of Islamic law, a Muslim woman cannot
unilaterally declare herself divorced (as a Muslim man can). A
similar challenge exists for Orthodox Jewish women living in
secular societies, as the husband’s consent is required for a
Jewish divorce (gett); civil divorces are not enough to release
them to remarry within their religious practice.281 As well
documented in the book, “The Wed-Locked Agunot: Orthodox
Jewish Women Chained to Dead Marriages,” Orthodox Jewish
women have been at the forefront of the movement to rectify the
plight of Jewish women stuck in marriages (agunah/agunot)
because of the disparities in divorce rights in Orthodox
interpretations of Jewish law.282
Central to the agunah question is that “[a]ccording to
[Jewish law], a Jewish marriage comes to an end by the husband
giving his wife a get [a written bill of divorce with specific
procedural requirements], a process only he can carry out.”283 A
woman becomes an agunah when for all intents and purposes
she is divorced but has yet to receive a get.284 Failure to receive
a get prohibits her from religiously remarrying, but no such
prohibition exists for her husband.285 If she remarries without
the get, under Jewish law she will be viewed as committing
adultery and any children resulting from such a marriage will
have the religious legal designation of mamzerim (illegitimate)
(which carries certain legal repercussions).286
Susan Aranoff and Rivka Haut led the effort to challenge
the Orthodox Jewish courts to end the plight of the agunot. In
particular, they publicized the inaction of the courts to help these
women and brought greater awareness to the Orthodox Jewish
community of the courts’ injustice. Aranoff and Haut document
how for some of the agunot the ill treatment of the Rabbinical
courts led to a crisis of faith and serious consideration of leaving
the Orthodox faith.287 This led to members in the community
280 Lee Ann Bambach, “That Ye Judge with Justice” Faith-Based Arbitration
by Muslims in an American Context 147 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory
University) (on file with author).
281 ARANOFF & HAUT, supra note 274, at 9.
282 Id.
283 Adena Berkowitz, The Prisoners of Divorce, LILITH, Winter 1987–1988, at 1
(italicization added).
284 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 248–49.
285 Id.
286 Benjamin Steiner, The Lieberman Clause Revisited, 69 AM. JEWISH
ARCHIVES J. 41, 44 (2017).
287 ARANOFF & HAUT, supra note 274, at 84.
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pressuring the Rabbinical courts to better address the legal needs
of the agunot.288 Although the issue persists today, Conservative
and Orthodox Jewish courts have taken steps to help resolve the
problem, as discussed in greater detail below.
In Israel, Muslim women have also led the initiative for
legal reform to address inequities under divorce law related to
maintenance. In the 1990s, Arab Muslim feminists joined forces
with Palestinian and non-Palestinian organizations to form a
“Working Group for Equality in Personal Status Issues.”289 The
stated goal of the group “was to ‘combat discrimination against
Arab women in the area of personal status, and change social
norms by promoting significant changes in attitudes and behavior
toward Arab women and their personal status issues.’”290 With the
passing of the Family Courts law in the Knesset (which created
parallel jurisdiction in parallel family law courts),291 the Working
Group launched a successful initiative for an amendment which
granted “Muslim and Christian women the option of recourse in
maintenance suits—as well as in all other matters of personal
status, except for marriage and divorce—to the new family
courts.”292 As discussed below,293 the Sharia courts reacted to these
calls for reform and limits on their jurisdiction by initiating an
internal reform of their own.294
In contrast, the Israeli Rabbinical courts have largely,
successfully resisted calls for reform. As a matter of law, the
Rabbinical courts must adhere to the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Israel, yet the political clout of Orthodox and UltraOrthodox Jews in Israel allows for the Rabbinical courts to
essentially disregard the Supreme Court decisions.295 Although
the majority of Jewish Israelis are not Orthodox, the Orthodox
control of the courts remains due to the political power of
Orthodox Jews and the role of Orthodox Judaism in national
identity.296 Scholars have noted that:
The term Jewish state denotes far more to Israelis than the fact that
a majority of its population is Jewish. Ninety-three percent of the
Jewish population believes that Israel ought to be a Jewish State. Now
Jewish state undoubtedly means different things to different people,
but to the vast majority of the population it means a state which is
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296

Id. at 84–85.
SHAHAR, supra note 28, at 100.
Id. at 101.
See id.
Id.
See infra Section III.C.
SHAHAR, supra note 28, at 101.
See Fournier et al., supra note 100, at 356, 358 n.130.
See EDELMAN, supra note 34, at 56.
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predominantly Jewish (83 percent), which lives in accordance with the
values of Judaism (64 percent), and whose public image is in accord
with the Jewish tradition (62 percent). Seventy-seven percent feel
that there ought to be some relationship between religion and state in
Israel. In other words, Jewishness contains religious overtones for the
vast majority of Israeli Jews, and they seek a reflection of this content
in the conduct of the state.297

This national identity strengthens the position of the Rabbinical
courts, as they are aware of the cultural affiliations of the
majority of the population. This translates into a reliance on the
courts for religious legal matters, such as divorce, that exists
even when civil options are available.
This is not to say that Jewish groups have not called for
reform. For instance, Israel now recognizes secular marriages
performed abroad, although divorce proceedings for those
marriages must still occur before the Rabbinical courts for
Jewish litigants.298 Furthermore, historically when Jewish
courts were serving minority populations, they “frequently had
to change the Law to meet novel conditions.”299 Those calling for
reform often “invoke the memory of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook
(1865–1935).”300 During the Mandate period, Rabbi Kook
“facilitated cooperation between Orthodox and other
Jews . . . by, among other things, reinterpreting Halachah to
deal with the exigencies of contemporary life.”301 For instance,
the successful passing of the Sanction Law in 1995 was “[a]
major step forward with regard to the agunah problem” created
by get refusal.302 Under the Sanctions Law, rabbinical court
judges may “issue sanctions and a variety of restrictive orders
upon a recalcitrant spouse.” While historically the community
would “use indirect pressure to influence a husband to issue a
bill of divorce,” the legislation has transferred that power to the
courts which may “withhold certain benefits of the husband.”303
Unfortunately, despite the ability to do so, Rabbinical courts
rarely utilize the Sanction Law and get refusal remains a
problem for Jewish women in Israel.304
297 Id. at 56–57 (quoting CHARLES LIEBMAN & ELIEZER DON-YEHIYA, CIVIL
RELIGION IN ISRAEL 13 (1983)).
298 Fournier et al., supra note 100, at 335, 335 n.18.
299 EDELMAN, supra note 34, at 68.
300 Id. at 69.
301 Id.
302 Fournier et al., supra note 100, at 360 n.135 (quoting RUTH HALPERINKADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 238 (2004)).
303 Id. at 350; see also Israel: Extrajudicial Sanctions Against Husbands
Noncompliant with Rabbinical Divorce Rulings, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (May 24, 2017),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/divorce-rulings/israel.php [https://perma.cc/P8JT-XACS].
304 See id.
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The “internal dynamics of the Orthodox subculture in
Israel” does not lend itself to accommodating the “exigencies of
contemporary life” created by the secular norms of the state.305
In part, this is due to the lack of a “rabbinical seminary offering
a university-oriented program of studies,” as exist in all other
Western countries with sizeable Jewish populations.306
Furthermore, a cultural attitude exists within Israel’s Orthodox
population to not “change the Halachic norms governing
marriage and divorce”307 and “for them the applicability of
religious law is not conditioned upon the secular lawmaker’s
will.”308 After the Israeli Supreme Court required the Rabbinical
courts to follow civil law, the Rabbinical court judges met and
formally rejected the decision on the grounds “that they consider
themselves bound only by the religious law and not by state law
or by precedents set by the SC.”309
This does not suggest that Halachic reform in the areas of
divorce and marriage law is inherently impossible, but rather that
the Rabbinical courts in Israel refuse to reform religious law at the
dictates of a secular state. Historical evidence exists of rabbinical
authorities reforming divorce and marriage law based on the needs
of the populace: “[F]or a period of approximately four hundred
years (650–1050), Rabbinic authorities in several Mediterranean
countries interpreted Halachah so as to permit either party to
obtain a divorce against the other’s will.”310 Furthermore, as
discussed in Part III, Jewish courts in contemporary jurisdictions
such as the United States are developing solutions to accommodate
the exigencies of contemporary life.311
E.

Institutional Parallels

The article thus far has portrayed RJBs serving minority
religious communities as responsive to external forces, including
pressure from litigants and civil courts. Although this account is a
new view of RJBs, the understanding of judicial tribunals as
responsive to forces beyond merely the law on the books resonates
with work in both constitutional theory and public administration.
First, consider the resonance between RJB accommodation and
theories of popular constitutionalism. Despite obvious differences
305
306
307
308
309
310
311

EDELMAN, supra note 34, at 69.
Id.
Id. at 70.
ENGLARD, supra note 24, at 46.
Gallala-Arndt, supra note 156, at 214.
EDELMAN, supra note 34, at 71 (emphasis in original).
See infra Sections III.A-B.
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between civil courts and RJBs, distinct similarities exist in the
dynamic between the Article III courts and the public and RJBs
and the populations they serve. As such, popular constitutionalism
echoes some of the explanations of why RJBs respond to popular
opinion. They face similar consequences if they are unresponsive to
popular opinion. Furthermore, in both instances, a tension exists
between faithfulness to the original intent of the founding texts and
responsiveness to the popular desire of the populace.
RJBs respond to changing values of religious laity by
reinterpreting the past legal commitments of previous generations
of scholars and applying these past commitments in new ways or
at a higher level of generality. According to one theory of popular
constitutionalism, Article III courts similarly “synthesize new
values and institutions with the past by reinterpreting the past
constitutional commitments of previous generations, showing how
what the political branches are doing is actually faithful both to the
Constitution and to the past.”312 One way in which Jewish and
Islamic RJBs demonstrate this approach is in their continued
commitment to regarding marriage as a contractual relationship,
while concurrently reinterpreting standard clauses of the marriage
contract to include protection for women in the event of divorce (as
discussed in more detail in Part III).313 Additionally, Article III
“courts may describe past commitments in new ways or at a
higher level of generality, often drawing on the entire history of
readings of the Constitution by political and judicial actors.”314
This parallels Islamic RJBs’ use of takhayyur, the methodology
that allows judges to draw on opinions from any of the four
classical schools of Islamic legal theory.315
Popular constitutionalism suggests that RJBs may face
consequences if they are unresponsive to the values and desires of
religious laity. Potential consequences include: “First, it may
render a judicial decision futile . . . . Second, outrage might make a
judicial decision perverse, in the sense that it might produce
consequences that are the opposite of those intended by the
Court.”316 Additionally, there is the view that “judges should attend
to public outrage because of the particular risks to the judiciary
Balkin, supra note 134, at 570.
Muslim American legal scholars have also taken similar approaches. For
instance, Asifa Quraishi-Landes has outlined how existing Islamic legal doctrines can be
used to support women’s rights. See Asifa Quraishi-Landes, A Mediation on Mahr,
Modernity, and Muslim Marriage Contract Law, in FEMINISM, LAW, AND RELIGION 173–
74 (Marie A. Failinger et al. eds., 2013).
314 Balkin, supra note 134, at 570.
315 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 183; Emon, supra note 82, at 397.
316 Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should
Judges Care, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 170–71 (2007) (emphasis in original).
312
313
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itself. Lacking electoral legitimacy or a police force, judges are
highly dependent on public acceptance of their authority. If the
public is outraged, judicial authority might well be jeopardized.”317
RJBs’ authority depends on the religious laity utilizing
them and accepting their judgment. Despite religious
commitments, religious laity may be prone to seek redress in civil
courts, instead of an RJB, if their civil rights might be lost by going
to an RJB. RJBs have very weak to non-existent enforcement
mechanisms, relying on religious commitment as a primary means
of ensuring their judgments are upheld.318 This weak enforcement
can lead to RJBs’ decisions being rendered futile. If RJBs contradict
an individual’s sense of justice or beliefs about religious law, then
they may not comply with the ruling, may not recommend the RJB
to others, and may not utilize the RJB in the future.
Outrage may also have eschatological implications that
render an RJB decision perverse. Since the RJBs aim to promote
the application of and adherence to religious law, outrage to a
decision may result in the opposite effect. Namely, because these
RJBs are operating in democratic societies that protect freedom of
religion and speech, religious laity may choose to leave their
religions. Within the Islamic context, apostasy has grave
eschatological impact, such that Islamic RJBs may be concerned
with the moral consequences of being implicated in causing
apostasy.319 Thus, beyond competition from civil-courts and the
possibility of forum shopping, the consequences facing RJBs
include potentially contributing to apostasy.
RJBs concerns regarding their continued existence also
resonate with the force at play in Wilson’s descriptions of
“organizational maintenance.” An organization’s maintenance “is
threatened by any number of forces which we might describe
generally as ‘strain.’ They include the withdrawal of valued
members . . . [and] the challenge of a rival organization . . . .”320
Organizational maintenance requires an active membership, which
for RJBs means a religious population that views the RJB as
legitimate and chooses to regularly utilize them.
Membership maintenance directly relates to an
organization’s ability to accommodate its environment—“[A]ll
organizations seek some form of accommodation with their
environment, because the costs of sustaining indefinitely a combatId. at 171.
Bambach, supra note 280, at 211, 286 (“Muslim faith-based ADR systems
generally . . . must rely on individuals’ good will and community pressure for
enforcement of arbitration decisions.”).
319 See generally SIMON COTTEE, THE APOSTATES: WHEN MUSLIMS LEAVE ISLAM (2015).
320 WILSON, supra note 13, at 30–31.
317
318
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oriented organization are generally too high to be borne by the
members.”321 Members of an RJB may bear personal costs if the
larger society views the RJB as out of sync with or even a threat to
its environment. For instance, within the context of Islamic RJBs
in England and the United States, if the larger society considers an
Islamic RJB at odds with secular norms, political organizations
may target it and the popular media may portray it as violating
women’s rights or threatening national security. In those
instances, social and political consequences may accompany any
affiliation with the RJB for individuals involved with the RJB.
RJBs, like political organizations, “are highly averse to
risk and thus avoid active rivalry except under special
circumstances.”322 This risk aversion leads to the “maintenance
strategy [of] develop[ing] autonomy—that is, a distinctive area
of competence, a clearly demarcated and exclusively served
clientele or membership, and undisputed jurisdiction over a
function, service, goal, or cause.”323 RJBs cannot completely
avoid competition with civil courts. They minimize the
competition, however, by creating procedural norms that mirror
the civil courts (thus, reducing the potential attractiveness of the
civil courts) and carving out undisputed competence and
jurisdiction over the application of religious law.
Finally, “[o]rganizations do not recruit and motivate
members from a homogenous population of equally interested, or
uninterested, prospects; rather, they offer inducements to persons
who differ.”324 While it may be easy to imagine the population that
utilizes an RJB as homogenous, in reality the population may differ
in significant ways, including religiosity, cultural and linguistic
background, age, and citizenship. Therefore, to maintain
membership, RJBs behave in ways that accommodate the broad
normative expectations of the diverse populations they serve.
Although RJBs are outside courts and public administration
bodies that popular constitutionalism and Wilson’s political
organization theory address, these strands of thought mirror some
of the forces at play with RJBs. In particular, RJBs face similar
concerns to Article III courts regarding the backlash they may face
from unpopular opinions. They also share motivations with political
organizations regarding self-preservation. In short, RJBs share
motivations and behaviors of other courts and political organizations
in secular democratic societies.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 263.
323 RONALD J. HREBENAR, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN AMERICA (71 (3d ed.
2015) (emphasis added).
324 WILSON, supra note 13, at 56.
321
322
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RJBS’ ACCOMMODATIONS: GENDER AND PROCEDURE

This Part substantiates the article’s core claim: that
religious judicial bodies accommodate the secular norms of the
nation in which they operate. It gathers several examples from
Islamic and Jewish RJBs serving minority populations in Israel,
the United States, and England. These RJBs have adjusted their
application of pre-marital agreements and divorce, arbitration
procedure, commercial law, and jurisdiction, all in an apparent
effort to gain legitimacy in the eyes of secular courts (which may
enforce their judgments) and litigants (who could otherwise
select a different forum).
The primary areas of accommodation have been in
divorce law and civil procedure. In the first instance, this is due
to two factors. First, the majority of cases before these RJBs are
divorce cases.325 Second, women’s rights—especially equalizing
the right to divorce—has become a rallying cry both for religious
women and for political forces opposed to RJBs.326 Conformity to
rules of civil procedure for arbitration-based RJBs has also been
a locus of accommodation, as “[f]ailure to comply with such
standards can serve as grounds for vacating [an] arbitration
award.”327 I contrast these examples with the example of
Rabbinical courts in Israel, which serve a majority population
and has adopted “an ideology under which any change or
alternation undermines the foundations of religion.”328
The U.S. and England: Gender Equality
Given that divorce cases comprise the majority of the cases
before the MAT and BDA, both RJBs have sought to align their
respective religious laws with the secular norms of substantive
justice of the state via the preemptive use of prenuptial
agreements and standardized marriage contracts to alleviate
inequalities in divorce proceedings.
In England, the Muslim Institute, Britain’s foremost Muslim
think-tank,329 drafted and has advocated for the use of its standard
marriage contract. The contract includes provisions such as:

Sandberg et al., supra note 7, at 276.
See Fournier et al., supra note 100, at 341, 345.
327 Helfand, supra note 260, at 144.
328 Pinhas Shifman, Civil Marriage in Israel: The Case for Reform, in JEWISH
FAMILY LAW, supra note 230, at 128.
329 The Muslim Inst., UK: Muslim Institute Launches Model Muslim Marriage
Contract, WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAWS, http://www.wluml.org/node/4749
[https://perma.cc/P2C8-FUVL].
325
326
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1) Removing the requirement for a “marriage guardian” (wali) for
the bride, who, as an adult, can make up her own mind about whom
to marry
2) Enabling the wife to initiate divorce and retain all her financial
rights agreed in the marriage contract
3) Forbidding polygamy whether formally or informally in the UK
or abroad
4)

Encouraging mosques to register to perform marriages330

The BDA has also looked at contractual solutions to address
inequalities in Jewish divorce law. The BDA has developed and
advocated for the use of a prenuptial agreement (the Prenup) to
address the unequal treatment of Jewish women under
Orthodox interpretations of Jewish law.331 In September 2015,
the Rabbinical Council of America issued a resolution stating
that its “members must utilize, in any wedding at which he is
the officiant (mesader kiddushin), in addition to a ketubah, a
rabbinically-sanctioned prenuptial agreement, where available,
that aids in our community’s efforts to ensure the timely and
unconditional issuance of a get.”332 The reasoning the BDA
provides for the need for the Prenup—from their website
theprenup.org—is that in modern society bataei din “frequently
lack the authority” to ensure that the “get is not improperly
withheld.”333 Therefore, the Prenup, which is entered into prior
to marriage, stipulates that in the event of divorce “the beit din
will have the proper authority to ensure that the get is not used
as a bargaining chip.”334
The recommended use of “the Prenup” resulted from a
long debate within the American Jewish community about how
to best address the issue of get refusal. It addresses the issue by
requiring, in the event of divorce, that the couple agree to
arbitrate the divorce before the BDA.
While the BDA is the most prominent Jewish judicial
body in the United States, it is but one of many such bodies.335
Distinct differences exist between Orthodox Jewish judicial
bodies (of which the BDA is one) and Conservative Jewish
BANO, supra note 275, at 234.
Explaining the Prenup: Jewish Divorce and the Role of the Prenup, PRENUP,
http://theprenup.org/explainingtheprenup.html [https://perma.cc/8SUR-5C5D].
332 2016 Resolution: Requiring the Use of Prenuptial Agreements for the
Prevention of Get-Refusal, RABBINICAL COUNCIL AMERICA (Sept. 22, 2016), http://
www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id=105863 [https://perma.cc/2332-MKB7].
333 Explaining the Prenup, supra note 331 (emphasis added).
334 Id.
335 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 80.
330
331
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judicial bodies. The differences between them in large part exist
due to their respective perspectives on “the extent to which
Jewish law could be bent to meet the ‘progressive standards of
American life.’”336 The get refusal problem is one of the
fundamental ways in which this difference has been drawn.
How to address the get refusal problem within the United
States became a major debate between Orthodox and Conservative
Jewish scholars.337 During this period, the Jewish Theological
Seminary (JTS)—the locus for Conservative Jewish scholarship
and home of Conservative Judaism’s judicial body, the JTS Beth
Din—crafted a solution known as the “Lieberman Clause.”338
Under the Lieberman Clause, the JTS Beth Din added an addenda
to the ketuba (the Jewish marriage contract), in which the parties
to the contract, the marrying couple, “agreed to recognize the Bet
Din of JTS as having the authority to counsel them to summon
either partner before it.”339 Today, the Orthodox BDA resolves this
issue by requiring the use of its pre-nuptial agreement.340
The U.S. and England: Secular Procedural Justice
The BDA displays a distinct consciousness of the secular
legal environment in which it operates and its reliance on civil
courts to enforce its decisions. It has constructed its judicial
bodies around six principles in order to “gain the respect of secular
courts.”341 While the BDA existed since 1960, the transformation
of the BDA into a respected arbitration venue began in 1996.342
The BDA board of directors deliberately “worked with the BDA’s
rabbinic leaders to craft an arbitration process that secular courts
are comfortable upholding.”343 Rather than merely focusing the
“technical legal requirements” to adhere to American arbitration
law, the BDA took a multi-pronged approach to gain the
confidence of American secular courts.344
The approach did not entail “substantive alternations of
Jewish law not permitted by the halakhic system itself,”345 but
rather existing options within the interpretation of Jewish law.
336 Steiner, supra note 286, at 42 (quoting JONATHAN D. SARNA, AMERICAN
JUDAISM: A HISTORY 240–41 (2004)).
337 See, e.g., Berkowitz, supra note 283, at 1.
338 Id. at 2.
339 Id.
340 See Explaining the Prenup, supra note 331.
341 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 139–40.
342 Id. at 139.
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id.
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The “permissible but innovative approaches” allow the BDA to
“successfully navigate[ ] the complex relationship between secular
and religious law in the United States,” providing religious
adherents a judicial form “consonant with both Jewish and
American law.”346 Michael Broyde, a member of the BDA and
Emory Law School professor, has identified six main pillars as key
elements to the success of the BDA. He describes these six main
pillars as follows: (1) the development of formal procedural rules,
ensuring due process for all parties; (2) the establishment of an
appellate process, promoting accountability and transparency; (3)
respect for the ultimate legal authority of the secular state; (4) the
use of “customs” in commercial cases; (5) “dual-system fluency” of
arbitrators in both the American legal system and their respective
religious law; and 6) an “active role” in representing their religious
communities’ interests to the larger society.347
Within these pillars, the BDA exhibits a distinct
conscientiousness of the larger, secular legal environment in
which it operates. This conscientiousness takes two forms: taking
into consideration the expectations of secular courts enforcing
their decisions and, importantly, taking into consideration the
expectations of disputants living within the secular environment.
The BDA displays awareness that disputants’ “sense of fairness
and justice” is informed by both their religious identity and their
membership as citizens of a secular state.348
Disputants’ expectations also come into consideration
regarding issues of custom and commercial practice. While
Jewish judges know the requirements of religious law, the
community may not and may have “already adopted the
commercial law norms of the general society in which it lives and
works and [have] fully integrated secular law norms with the
Jewish law.”349 Within Jewish law this does not necessarily mean
that Jewish law will be contravened to meet the expectations of
disputants. Rather, within the realm of commercial matters, two
elements allow for this accommodation: (1) “any condition that
is agreed upon with respect to monetary matters is valid, and (2)
customs established among merchants acquire Jewish law
validity, provided that the practices stipulated or commonly
undertaken are not otherwise ritually prohibited.”350 The
introduction to the BDA’s rules of procedure recognizes that the
BDA “provides a forum where adherents of Jewish law can seek
346
347
348
349
350

Id.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 156.
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to have their disputes resolved in a manner consistent with the
rules of Jewish law (halacha) and with the recognition that
many individuals conduct commercial transactions in
accordance with the commercial standards of the secular
society.”351 To achieve this, the BDA rule Section 3(e) states that
the BDA will accept “common commercial practices . . . to the
fullest extent permitted by Jewish Law.”352
The BDA also accepts the jurisdictional limits imposed by
the secular state. For instance, recognizing that a religious
divorce will never also serve as a civil divorce, the BDA has taken
measures to ensure that divorcing couples also receive a civil
divorce. To this end, the BDA hinges the effect of the religious
divorce on the attainment of civil divorce. The BDA Jewish
divorce documents state that each party is “free to marry provided
that s/he is also civilly divorced.”353 Rather than renouncing civil
divorce as illegitimate, and advocating for Jewish marriage and
divorce alone, the BDA recognizes the limits on its jurisdictions
and the importance of civil marriage in regards to the protection
of civil rights for Jews living in under secular, civil law.
The MAT in England followed in the footsteps of the BDA
to deliberately create “innovative processes . . . ensur[ing] that
its arbitrations would conform to the formal requirements of the
Arbitration Act, garner the respect of British courts, and make
judges more comfortable enforcing its rulings.”354 Also like the
BDA, the MAT has used innovation within the religious legal
tradition, particularly in regards to procedure, to craft “an
arbitration process that gives British Muslims the opportunity
for effective dispute resolution services consistent with both
British and Islamic law.”355 In doing so, the MAT views itself “as
building on Islamic law’s normative adjudicatory framework in
light of contemporary views about what procedures best protect
litigants and ensure just outcomes.”356
A 2009–2011 Cardiff University study found that like
their American counterparts, “religious courts [in England]
strongly encourage the parties to obtain a civil divorce before they
engage in religious proceedings, recognising that the law of the
state takes priority and that it is in no one’s interest to have a

BETH DIN AMERICA, supra note 259.
Id. at 5.
353 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 152 (citing LOUIS JACOBS, THE JEWISH RELIGION:
A COMPANION 132–33, 188 (1995)).
354 Id. at 179.
355 Id.
356 Id. at 181.
351
352
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‘limping marriage.’”357 This respect and prioritization of the laws
of the state also extends into the asserted jurisdiction of Jewish
and Islamic judicial bodies in the United States and England.
What is absent from any of these RJBs are attempts to
expand their jurisdiction. Within the English and American
context, what we do not see are any indications that these RJBs
desire to expand their jurisdiction beyond their current
limitations. There are no efforts, for example, to expand their
scope to include criminal or tort law. Jewish and Muslim RJBs
in both the informal context of unenforceable ADR and the more
formal context of enforceable arbitration have accepted that,
though their respective religious legal systems apply to a much
broader range of contexts, they will limit themselves to the
matters of commercial and family law permitted under civil law.
The Islamic RJBs in Israel: Gender Equality and Civil
Courts
The Israeli Sharia courts in recent decades have also had
to address the issue of limitations on their jurisdiction. They
have responded to the threats of the civil courts to the erosion of
their jurisdiction with sincere concern around the potential loss
of Muslims to the civil courts and a desire to accommodate the
needs of the entire Muslim population.358 The response of the
Israeli Sharia court to the attempts of the secular courts to erode
its jurisdiction can be traced to two causes: (1) the minority
identity of the population it serves; and (2) its sources of law.
The Sharia courts serve the Muslim population of Israel, which
is Arab and “largely [has] an Arab-nationalist consciousness.”359
For this Muslim population, recourse to civil courts reflects
issues related to political identity. Although the qadis (judges)
are state appointed, the Sharia courts represent a degree of legal
autonomy, otherwise not enjoyed by the Arab Muslim
population.360 Furthermore, recourse via legislative action is also
complicated due to political and religious identity. Petitioning
the Knesset for legislative reform is tantamount to inviting the
Israeli State to further interfere in the narrow autonomy of the
Arab Muslim population.

357 Elizabeth Butler-Sloss & Mark Hill, Family Law: Current Conflicts and
Their Resolution, in ISLAM AND ENGLISH LAW: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE PLACE
OF SHARIA 108, 111 (Robin Griffith-Jones ed., 2013).
358 See SHAHAR, supra note 28, at 102–03.
359 ENGLARD, supra note 24, at 46.
360 See Ramadan, supra note 165, 294–95.
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Furthermore, from a religious-legal perspective,
statutory codification of Islamic Law is only “appropriate for
independent Muslim countries.”361 Without a Muslim sovereign
or independent Muslim legislative authority, the only means for
reform is via the Sharia Court of Appeal.362 Israel’s Jewish
population does not face the same political or religious concerns
and has civil and legislative options for reform as the majority
Jewish population.
In the area of divorce, the Sharia courts have carried out
a series of reforms via the Sharia Court of Appeals. These
appeals have “led to an improvement of women’s status with
relation to divorce,” resulting in dissolution of a marriage
becoming “an option for both husband and wife.”363 These
reforms have in large part derived from a shift in the
relationship of the Sharia Court to Islamic Law. Rather than
strictly adhering to traditional interpretations of Islamic Law,
the Justices on the Sharia Court of Appeals look to it for
“inspiration” and derive their rulings from a variety of sources,
such as the laws of regional Muslim majority countries like
Egypt and Jordan.364 Furthermore, the Qadis do not restrain
themselves to a single school for their sources of inspiration.
While they restrain themselves to the realm of Sunni Islam, they
may draw on multiple schools, such as Maliki and Hanafi
jurisprudence, in an opinion. Specifically, the Islamic Law the
Sharia Court of Appeals draws upon is “an interaction between
jurist’s law written by fuqaha, statute law inspired by these
fuqaha and the legal contributions of the qadis.”365 By broadly
drawing on a wide range of legal sources that may all broadly
fall under Islamic law, the qadis may select the legal opinion or
reasoning that best meets the specific needs of a case.
The Sharia courts, however, have only engaged in the
process of reforming their understanding of Islamic Law for the past
two decades. This change can be traced back to the appointment of
three qadis to the Sharia Court of Appeals: Ahmad Natur, Faruq
Zu’bi and Zaki Midlag.366 Under their guidance the Court “initiated
a policy which attempted to balance women’s rights on the one hand
and meet the requirements of the Islamic movement on the other.”367
See Layish, supra note 26, at 214.
Id.
363 Moussa Abou Ramadan, Divorce Reform in the Shari’a Court of Appeals in
Israel (1992–2003), 13 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 242, 257 (2006).
364 See Layish, supra note 26, at 188–89, 206.
365 Ramadan, supra note 363, at 245.
366 Moussa Abou Ramadan, Islamic Legal Reform: Sharia Court of Appeals and
Maintenance for Muslim Wives in Israel, 4 HAWWA 29 (2006).
367 Id. at 30.
361
362
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They have “introduced reforms in the fields of maintenance, child
custody, inheritance, and procedure.”368 They have also “adopted
facets of Israeli legislation, such as the principle of judging in the
interest of the child,”369 as a means to better reflect the sensibilities
of the populations they serve and to prophylactically avoid further
erosion of their jurisdiction by the civil courts. They have
accomplished this reform via creatively interpreting traditional
Islamic jurisprudence, “reaffirming its power over the regional
Shari’ah Courts,” and “enhancing its symbolic image.”370
Qadi Natur, former President of the Israeli Sharia Court
of Appeals, played a particularly important role in these reforms.
The Qadi Law of 2002 has increased the perceived legitimacy of
qadis as arbiters of Islamic Law.371 The Qadi Law granted the
president of the Sharia Court “jurisdiction to make the procedures
faster and more efficient, to adopt temporary procedures, and to
disqualify qadis,” similar to the efficiency found in arbitration
systems.372 Qadi Natur served as President of the Court of
Appeals for two decades until 2013.373 It was under his tenure that
the Sharia Court of Appeals began its “process of judicial
activism . . . which continues until this day.”374 This judicial
activism has relied heavily on the creation of a hierarchy of law
(which previously did not exist in Islamic Law) and the issuance
of pseudo-legislation in the form of circulars.375
The Jewish RJBs in Israel: Resistance
The Sharia and Rabbinical courts have responded to
threats to their jurisdiction from the Israeli Supreme Court in
very different ways. The Rabbinical courts have mostly refused to
reform religious law to meet the needs and pressures of the entire
Jewish population and thus alleviate motivations for Israeli Jews
to petition civil courts for relief. The Rabbinical court claims to
“protect its autonomy against external interference of the secular
authority,” but ignores the increasing expansion of civil law into
the area of family law.376 Furthermore, the Rabbinical court has
Id.
Ramadan, supra note 363, at 243.
370 Ramadan, supra note 165, at 297.
371 The Qadis Law (No. 10) 2002.
372 Ramadan, supra note 363, at 248.
373 Former President of Sharia Court of Appeals in Israel Joins Hebrew
University Faculty of Law, HEBREW UNIV. OF JERUSALEM (Sept. 9, 2013), https://
new.huji.ac.il/en/article/18476 [https://perma.cc/L292-2MWD].
374 Ramadan, supra note 165, at 256.
375 See id. at 297.
376 Shifman, supra note 328, at 103.
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been accused of “covering up its religious failure to deal with the
social and cultural reality of Israel.”377
As noted earlier, in response to an Israeli Supreme Court
case limiting the Rabbinical courts’ jurisdiction, the Rabbinical
courts judges met and formally declared that they were rejecting
the decision and would not comply with it on the grounds “that they
consider themselves bound only by the religious law and not by
state law or by precedents set by the [Supreme Court].”378 Although
the secular, civil courts in Israel view the Rabbinical courts as
subject to the laws of the state and ruling under state authority,
religious judges believe that their application of religious law “is
not conditioned upon the secular lawmaker’s will.”379
The Jewish population has mostly responded to the
recalcitrant position of the Rabbinical courts through legislative
action380 and selection of civil options (such as marriage aboard).381
Today, the majority of Jewish Israelis are not Orthodox382 and the
Rabbinical courts do not necessarily reflect their non-Orthodox
understanding of religion. For instance, the Rabbinical courts do
not accommodate Conservative or Reform interpretations of
Jewish Law commonly found in the United States. The Orthodox
men that sit on the Rabbinical courts tend to “apply Jewish law in
its most traditional form” and “adhere to the principle that women
should be confined to the private sphere.”383
The Rabbinical courts’ response to threats to their
jurisdiction has recently taken the form of asserting jurisdiction
over Israeli Jews who seek to avoid their authority. For instance,
in a 2010 divorce, the Rabbinical courts assumed jurisdiction over
a couple who married “in Cyprus because, as secular Jews, they
wished to avoid religious requirements.”384 Rather than applying
the Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling requiring the Rabbinical courts
to provide a quick dissolution of the marriage, the Rabbinical court
disregarded the Supreme Court’s ruling and required a full get.385
The problem of get refusal remains a serious one for
Jewish women in Israel. Despite the intervention of secular
courts in this area, the intervention of the secular courts “has
Id.
Gallala-Arndt, supra note 156, at 214.
379 Englard, supra note 24, at 46.
380 See Gallala-Arndt, supra note 156, at 204 (“On 28 October 2013 the Israeli
parliament (the Knesset) voted in a law allowing couples who want to marry to choose
the rabbi who will perform their marriage.”).
381 See Triger, supra note 4, at 6.
382 Pnina Lahav, Israel’s Rosit the Riveter: Between Secular Law and Jewish
Law, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1063, 1064–65 (2013).
383 Id. at 1065.
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led to a stalemate.”386 In response to the attempts of the secular
courts to erode their jurisdiction, the Rabbinical courts have
developed “an ideology under which any change or alteration
undermines the foundations of religion.”387 At the same time, the
availability for recourse to the civil courts reduces “the pressure
that could otherwise be brought upon” the courts to reform their
interpretations and interpret Jewish law in a way that “would
show awareness of the exigencies of life . . . sensitivity to the
needs of the hour and flexibility in the face of the conditions of
the time and place.”388
CONCLUSION
Muslim and Jewish judicial bodies serving minority
populations demonstrate a willingness to accommodate the
secular norms of substantive and procedural justice of the state.
As other scholars have noted, when adopting facets of secular
law, these religious courts rarely acknowledge that they are
borrowing the dominant legal system, but rather they undertake
a process of internal contextualization, such that the principles
are established as existing within the religion itself.389 Through
this process of internalization, the courts meet the procedural
requirements necessary for enforcement by the state and meet
the expectations of litigants necessary to maintain legitimacy.
Conversely, the example of the Rabbinical courts in
Israel shows rigid adherence to religious law as unchanging and
unaccommodating. Since the courts shifted from their position
of serving a minority population under the Ottoman Empire to
serving a majority population with the inception of the State of
Israel, the Rabbinical court “has been less flexible and less
innovative in its Halachic interpretation.”390
This suggests that perhaps assumptions about Islamic
courts in majority-Muslim countries as “archaic, unchanging
institutions”391 have more to do with the political environments in
which they operate and the majoritarian populations they serve,
386 Matthijs de Blois, Religious Law Versus Secular Law, The Example of the
Get Refusal in Dutch, English and Israeli Law, 6 UTRECHT L. REV. 93, 106 (2010).
387 Shifman, supra note 328, at 128.
388 Id. at 128–29.
389 Ramadan, supra note 363, at 243 (“[T]he Shari’a Court of Appeals has
adopted facets of Israeli legislation, such as the principle of judging in the interest of the
child, even though it does not acknowledge borrowing from the Israeli legal system.
Rather, this principle undergoes a procedure of Islamicization (i.e., it is interpreted as
existing in the Shari’a itself), and the Shari’a Court of Appeals holds that fiqh rules
concerning custody constitute a mere presumption that can be refuted.”).
390 EDELMAN, supra note 34, at 53.
391 SHAHAR, supra note 28, at 39.
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than an inherent flaw in Islamic law itself. To fully answer this
query, additional research on the historical and contemporary
operation of Jewish and Islamic courts is necessary.
Based on the findings of this article, future avenues of
inquiry might examine the factors and mechanisms that
promote or deter majority serving RJBs’ responsiveness to
popular opinion and the secular norms of the state in a variety
of democratic countries. For instance, a fuller examination
might comparatively examine the Rabbinical courts of Israel,
Hindu courts in India, and Sharia courts in Indonesia focusing
particularly on the role of religion to national identity and the
use of political coalitions to protect RJBs. Such an inquiry might
also include a close review of the published opinions of these
RJBs to determine their legal reasoning in instances where they
demonstrate a willingness to accommodate popular opinion or
the secular norms of the state.
This article’s focus has been on conceiving of religious
judicial bodies more broadly to include both state-run and
arbitration bodies and orienting the inquiry on RJBs from the
prevailing perspective of whether democratic legal systems
should accommodate religious legal pluralism to whether RJBs
accommodate litigants and their environment. By looking at
RJBs that serve majority and minority populations, this article
suggests, that at the very least, the cultural and political
position of an RJB influences its willingness to consider context
and environment in the application of religious law.

